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Abstract
Paul Bernays and David Hilbert carefully avoided overspecification of Hilbert’s
ε-operator and axiomatized only what was relevant for their proof-theoretic inves-
tigations. Semantically, this left the ε-operator underspecified. In the meanwhile,
there have been several suggestions for semantics of the ε as a choice operator. Af-
ter reviewing the literature on semantics of Hilbert’s epsilon operator, we propose a
new semantics with the following features: We avoid overspecification (such as right-
uniqueness), but admit indefinite choice, committed choice, and classical logics. More-
over, our semantics for the ε supports proof search optimally and is natural in the sense
that it does not only mirror some cases of referential interpretation of indefinite arti-
cles in natural language, but may also contribute to philosophy of language. Finally,
we ask the question whether our ε within our free-variable framework can serve as
a paradigm useful in the specification and computation of semantics of discourses in
natural language.
Keywords: Hilbert’s epsilon Operator, Logical Foundations, Theories of Truth and Va-
lidity, Formalized Mathematics, Human-Oriented Interactive Theorem Proving, Auto-
mated Theorem Proving, Formal Philosophy of Language, Computational Linguistics
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31 Motivation, Requirements Specification, and Overview
In [Wirth, 2004] we have analyzed the combination of mathematical induction in the liberal
style of Fermat’s descente infinie with state-of-the-art logical deduction into a formal sys-
tem in which a working mathematician can straightforwardly develop his proofs supported
by powerful automation. We have found only a single semantical justification meeting the
requirements resulting from this analysis. The means for this semantical justification in-
clude a novel semantics for Hilbert’s ε-symbol, namely an indefinite choice mirroring some
cases of referential interpretation of indefinite articles in natural languages.
Hilbert’s ε-symbol is a binder that forms terms; just like Peano’s ι-symbol, which is
sometimes1 attributed to Russell and written as ι¯ or as an inverted ι. Roughly speaking,
the term εx. A formed from a variable x and a formula A denotes an object that is chosen
such that —if possible— A (seen as a predicate on x) holds for it.
For the usefulness of descriptive terms such as εx. A and ιx. A, we consider the
requirements listed below to be the most important ones. Our new indefinite ε-operator
satisfies these requirements and—as it is defined by novel semantical techniques—may serve
as the paradigm for the design of similar operators satisfying these requirements. As such
descriptive terms are of universal interest and applicability, we suppose that our novel
treatment will turn out to be useful in many additional areas where logic is designed or
applied as a tool for description and reasoning.
Requirement I (Syntax): The syntax must clearly express where exactly a commitment
to a choice of a special object is required, and where—to the contrary—different
objects corresponding with the description may be chosen for different occurrences of
the same descriptive term.
Requirement II (Reasoning): In a reductive proof step, it must be possible to replace
a descriptive term with a term that corresponds with its description. The soundness
of such a replacement must be expressible and should be verifiable in the original
calculus.
Requirement III (Semantics): The semantics should be simple, straightforward, natu-
ral, formal, and model-based. Overspecification should be avoided carefully. Further-
more, the semantics should be modular and abstract in the sense that it adds the
operator to a variety of logics, independently of the details of a concrete logic.
This paper organizes as follows: After a general introduction to the ε in § 2 and a review
of the literature on the ε’s semantics w.r.t. adequacy and Hilbert’s intentions in § 3, we
explain and formalize our novel approach to the ε’s semantics, first informally in § 4 and
then formally in § 5. Finally, in § 6, we discuss some possible implications on philosophy of
language, put our ε to test with a list of linguistic examples, and ask the question whether
our ε within our free-variable framework can serve as a paradigm useful in the specification
and computation of semantics of discourses in natural language.
42 General Introduction to Hilbert’s ε
To make this paper accessible to a broader readership, in this § 2, we motivate the ε by
introducing first the ι (§ 2.1), then the ε itself (§ 2.2), its proof-theoretic origin (§ 2.3),
and our contrasting semantical objective in this paper (§ 2.4) with its emphasis on definite
choice (§ 2.5) and committed choice (§ 2.6). Although the well-informed expert is likely to
be amused, he may well skip this § 2 and continue with § 3.
2.1 From the ι to the ε
2.1.1 Intuition behind the ι-Operator
It has turned out not to be completely superfluous to remark that I do not want to hurt
any religious feelings with the following example. The delicate subject is chosen for its
mnemonic value.
Example 2.1 (ι-binder) (Buggy!)
For an informal introduction to the ι-binder, consider Father to be a predicate for which
Father(Heinrich III,Heinrich IV)
holds, i.e. “Heinrich III is father of Heinrich IV”.
Now, “the father of Heinrich IV” can be denoted by ιx. Father(x,Heinrich IV), and because
this is nobody but Heinrich III, i.e.
Heinrich III = ιx. Father(x,Heinrich IV),
we know that
Father(ιx. Father(x,Heinrich IV),Heinrich IV)
Similarly,
Father(ιx. Father(x,Adam),Adam), (2.1.1)
and thus ∃y. Father(y,Adam), but, oops! Adam and Eve do not have any fathers.
If you do not agree, you would probably appreciate the following problem that occurs when
somebody has God as an additional father.
Father(Holy Ghost, Jesus) ∧ Father(Joseph, Jesus). (2.1.2)
Then the Holy Ghost is the father of Jesus and Joseph is the father of Jesus, i.e.
Holy Ghost = ιx. Father(x, Jesus) ∧ Joseph = ιx. Father(x, Jesus) (2.1.3)
which implies something the Pope may not accept, namely that
Holy Ghost = Joseph,
and he anathematized Heinrich IV in the year 1076:
Anathematized(ιx.Pope(x),Heinrich IV, 1076). (2.1.4)
52.1.2 Semantics of the ι-Operator
There are basically2 three ways of giving semantics to the ι-terms:
Russell’s ι-operator: In [Whitehead & Russell, 1910–1913], the ι-terms do not refer to
an object but make sense only in the context of a sentence. This was nicely described
already in [Russell, 1905a], without using any symbol for the ι, however; cf. our § 6.2.
Hilbert’s ι-operator: To overcome the complex difficulties of that non-referential defi-
nition, in [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70, Vol. I, p. 392ff.], a completed proof of ∃!x.A
was required to precede any formation of the term ιx. A, which otherwise was not
to be considered a well-formed term at all.
Peano’s ι-operator: Since the inflexible treatment of Hilbert’s ι-operator makes the ι
quite impractical and the formal syntax of logic undecidable in general, in Vol. II of
the same book, the ε, however, is already given a more flexible treatment. There,
the simple idea is to leave the ε-terms uninterpreted, as will be described below. In
this paper, we present this more flexible view also for the ι, just as required by an
anonymous referee of a previous version of this paper. Moreover, this view is already
Peano’s original one, cf. (ι¯0) of Note 1.
At least in non-modal classical logics, it is a well justified standard that any term denotes.
More precisely—in each model or structure S under consideration—any occurrence of a
proper term must denote an object in the universe of S. (This does not mean that this
object has to satisfy properties of ontological existence or definedness in S, cf. § 6.2.4.)
Following that standard, to be able to write down ιx. A without further consideration, we
have to treat ιx. A as an uninterpreted term about which we only know
∃!x.A ⇒ A{x 7→ ιx. A} (ι0)
or in different notation
(∃!x. (A(x))) ⇒ A(ιx. (A(x)))
or in set notation
∃!x. (x∈A) ⇒ ιx. (x∈A) ∈ A
where, for some new y, we can define
∃!x.A := ∃y. ∀x.
(
x=y ⇔ A
)
With (ι0) as the only axiom for the ι, the term ιx. A has to satisfy A (seen as a predicate
on x) only if there exists a unique object such that A holds for it. Moreover, the problems
presented in Example 2.1 do not appear because (2.1.1) and (2.1.3) are not valid. Indeed,
the description of (2.1.1) lacks existence and the descriptions of (2.1.3) and (2.1.4) lack
uniqueness. The price we have to pay here is that—roughly speaking— ιx. A is of no use
unless the unique existence ∃!x.A can be derived.
62.1.3 Why ε is more useful than ι
Compared to the ι, the ε is more useful because—instead of (ι0)—it comes with the stronger
axiom
∃x.A ⇒ A{x 7→ εx. A} (ε0)
More precisely, as the formula ∃x.A (which has to be true to guarantee a meaningful
interpretation of the ε-term εx. A ) is weaker than the corresponding formula ∃!x.A (for
the resp. ι-term), the area of useful application is wider for the ε- than for the ι-operator.
Moreover, in case of ∃!x.A, the ε-operator picks the same element as the ι-operator, i.e.
∃!x.A ⇒
(
εx. A = ιx. A
)
Although the ι is thus somewhat outdated since the appearance of the superior ε, it is still
alive: cf. e.g. [Andrews, 2002], [Nipkow &al., 2002]. For example, in [Nipkow &al., 2002],
p. 85, for the definiendum µx.A of the µ-operator (which picks the least natural number
satisfying a formula) we find the definiens
ιx.
(
A ∧ ∀y. (A{x7→y} ⇒ xy)
)
for some new variable y, although the logic of Isabelle/HOL (as given in [Nipkow &al.,
2002]) contains an ε, and a definiens of
εx.
(
A ∧ ∀y. (A{x7→y} ⇒ xy)
)
would imply the relevant axiom
∃x.A ⇒ A{x 7→ µx.A} ∧ ∀y. (A{x7→y} ⇒ µx.A  y) (µ0)
for any well-founded total quasi-ordering, while the definition via ι requires antisymmetry
in addition. Moreover, a special additional uniqueness proof is required for each unfolding
of the definition via ι, hopefully realized automatically, however, with a closely integrated
Linear Arithmetic, cf. e.g. [Schmidt-Samoa, 2006]. Indeed, the superior definition via ε is
found in [Nipkow &al., 2000].
2.2 What is Hilbert’s ε?
As the basic methodology of David Hilbert’s formal program is to treat all symbols as
meaningless, he does not give us any semantics but only the axiom (ε0).
Although no meaning is required, it furthers the understanding. And therefore, in [Hilbert
& Bernays, 1968/70], the fundamental work on the contributions of David Hilbert and his
group to the logical foundations of mathematics, Paul Bernays writes:
7εx. A . . . \iĆ ein Ding deŊ IndividuŚnbereiĚŊ, und zwar iĆ dieseŊ Ding gemĽ der inhaltliĚen Ueber-
seŃung der Formel (ε0) ei n s o l Ě e Ŋ, au f d a Ŋ j e n e Ŋ P r Ľ d i k a t A
z u t r i Ď t, v o r au Ŋ g e s e Ń t, d a sŊ e Ŋ đ b e r h au p t au f ei n D i n g
d e Ŋ I n d i v i d u Ś n b e r ei Ě Ŋ z u t r i Ď t."
[Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70, Vol. II, p.12, modernized orthography]
εx. A . . . “is an object of the universe for which—according to the semantical
translation of the formula (ε0)—the predicate A holds, provided that A holds for
any object of the universe at all.” (our translation)
Example 2.2 (ε instead of ι, part I) (continuing Example 2.1)
Just as for the ι, for the ε we again have
Heinrich III = εx. Father(x,Heinrich IV)
and
Father(εx. Father(x,Heinrich IV),Heinrich IV).
But, from the contrapositive of (ε0) and
¬Father(εx. Father(x,Adam),Adam),
we now can conclude that
¬∃y. Father(y,Adam).
2.3 On the ε’s Proof-Theoretic Origin
David Hilbert did not need any semantics or precise intention for the ε-symbol because it was
introduced merely as a formal syntactical device to facilitate proof-theoretic investigations,
motivated by the possibility to get rid of the existential and universal quantifiers via
∃x.A ⇔ A{x 7→ εx. A} (ε1)
and
∀x.A ⇔ A{x 7→ εx.¬A} (ε2)
Note that ε0, ε1, and ε2 are no ordinal numbers but simply the original labels from [Hilbert
& Bernays, 1968/70]. ε5 is from [Hermes, 1965]. The other labels we use are mostly
from [Leisenring, 1969], such as (E2) and (Q2). We recommend [Leisenring, 1969] as an ex-
cellent treatment of the subject of the first-order ε-calculus, using a language more modern
than the one of [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70].
8When we remove all quantifiers in a derivation of the Hilbert-style predicate calculus
of [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70] along (ε1) and (ε2), the following transformations occur:
Tautologies are turned into tautologies, the axiom schemes3 A{x7→t} ⇒ ∃x.A and
∀x.A ⇒ A{x7→t} are turned into
A{x7→t} ⇒ A{x 7→ εx. A} (ε-formula)
and—roughly speaking w.r.t. two-valued logics—its contrapositive, respectively. The infer-
ence steps are turned into inference steps: modus ponens intomodus ponens; instantiation of
free variables as well as quantifier introduction into instantiation including ε-terms. Finally,
the ε-formula is taken as a new axiom scheme instead of (ε0) because it has the advantage
of being free of quantifiers.
This argumentation is actually the start of the proof transformation of the 1st ε-theorem,
in which the elimination of the ε-formulas did not come easy to Wilhelm Ackermann and
David Hilbert.
Theorem 2.3 (Extd. 1st ε-Theorem, [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70, Vol. II, p.79f.])
If we can derive ∃x1. . . .∃xr. A (containing no bound variables besides the ones bound by
the prenex ∃x1. . . .∃xr.) from the formulas P1, . . . , Pk (containing no bound variables)
in the predicate calculus (incl., as axiom schemes, ε-formula and, for equality, reflexivity
and substitutability), then, from P1, . . . , Pk, in the elementary calculus (i.e. tautologies plus
modus ponens and instantiation of free variables), we can derive a (finite) disjunction of
the form
∨s
i=0 A{x1, . . . , xr 7→ ti,1, . . . , ti,r} in a derivation where bound variables do not
occur at all.
Note that r, s range over natural numbers including 0, and that A, ti,j, and Pi are ε-free
because otherwise they would have to include (additional) bound variables.
Moreover, the 2nd ε-Theorem in [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70, Vol. II], states that the ε
(just as the ι, cf. [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70, Vol. I]) is a conservative extension of the
predicate calculus in the sense that any formal proof of an ε-free formula can be transformed
into a formal proof that does not use the ε at all. Generally, however, it is not a conservative
extension to add the ε either with (ε0), with (ε1), or with the ε-formula to other first-order
logics—may they be weaker such as intuitionistic logic,4 or stronger such as set theories with
axiom schemes over arbitrary terms including the ε, cf. § 3.1.3. Moreover, even in standard
first-order logic there is no translation from the formulas containing the ε to formulas not
containing it.
2.4 Our Objective
While the historical and technical research on the ε-theorems is still going on and the
method of ε-elimination and ε-substitution did not die with Hilbert’s program, this is not
our subject here. We are less interested in Hilbert’s program and the consistency of mathe-
matics than in the powerful use of logic in creative processes. And, instead of the tedious
syntactical proof transformations, which easily lose their usefulness and elegance within
9their technical complexity and which—more importantly—can only refer to an already ex-
isting logic, we look for semantical means for finding new logics and new applications. And
the question that still has to be answered in this field is: What would be a proper semantics
for Hilbert’s ε?
2.5 Indefinite Choice
Just as the ι-symbol is usually taken to be the referential interpretation of the definite
articles in natural languages, it is our opinion that the ε-symbol should be that of the
indefinite determiners (articles and pronouns) such as “a(n)” or “some”.
Example 2.4 (ε instead of ι, part II) (continuing Example 2.1)
It may well be the case that
Holy Ghost = εx. Father(x, Jesus) ∧ Joseph = εx. Father(x, Jesus)
i.e. that “The Holy Ghost is a father of Jesus and Joseph is a father of Jesus.” But this
does not bring us into trouble with the Pope because we do not know whether all fathers of
Jesus are equal. This will become clearer when we reconsider this example in Example 4.8.
Philosophy of language will be further discussed in § 6.
2.6 Committed Choice
Closely connected to indefinite choice (also called “indeterminism” or “don’t care nondeter-
minism”) is the notion of “committed choice”. For example, when we have a new telephone,
we typically don’t care which number we get, but once the provider has chosen a number
for our telephone, we want them to commit to this choice, i.e. not to change our phone
number between two incoming calls.
Example 2.5 (Committed Choice) (Buggy!)
Suppose we want to prove ∃x. (x 6= x)
According to (ε1) from § 2.3 this reduces to εx. (x 6=x) 6= εx. (x 6=x)
Since there is no solution to x 6= x we can replace
εx. (x 6=x) with anything. Thus, the above reduces to 0 6= εx. (x 6=x)
and then, by exactly the same argumentation, to 0 6= 1
which is valid.
Thus we have proved our original formula ∃x. (x 6= x), which, however, happens to be
invalid. What went wrong? Of course, we have to commit to our choice for all occurrences
of the ε-term introduced when eliminating the existential quantifier: If we choose 0 on the
left-hand side, we have to commit to the choice of 0 on the right-hand side, too.
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3 Semantics for Hilbert’s ε in the Literature
In this § 3, we review the literature on the ε’s semantics with a an emphasis on practical
adequacy and Hilbert’s intentions.
3.1 Right-Unique Semantics
In contrast to the indefiniteness we suggested in § 2.5, in the literature nearly all semantics
for Hilbert’s ε-operator are functional, i.e. [right-] unique; cf. [Leisenring, 1969] and the
references there.
3.1.1 Ackermann’s (II,4) = Bourbaki’s (S7) = Leisenring’s (E2)
In [Ackermann, 1938] under the label (II,4), in [Bourbaki, 1939ff.] under the label (S7)
(where a τ is written for the ε, which must not be confused with Hilbert’s τ -operator, cf.
Note 4), and in [Leisenring, 1969] under the label (E2), we find the following axiom scheme:
∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ εx. A0 = εx. A1 (E2)
Contrary to our version (E2′) in Lemma5.18 of § 5.6, in the standard framework the
axiom (E2) imposes a right-unique behavior for the ε-operator, which is based on the
extension of the predicate.
Axiom systems including (E2) are called extensional because—from a semantical point
of view—the value of εx. A in each semantical structure S is functionally dependent on
the extension of the formula A, i.e. on { o | eval(S ⊎ {x7→o})(A) }, where ‘eval’ is the
standard evaluation function that maps a structure (or algebra, interpretation) (including
a valuation of the free variables) to a function mapping terms and formulas to values.
To get more freedom for the definition of a semantics of the ε, in [Meyer-Viol, 1995]
and in [Giese & Ahrendt, 1999] the value of εx. A may additionally depend on the syntax
besides the semantics.5 It is then given as a function depending on a semantical structure
and on the syntactical details of the term εx. A. We read:
“This definition contains no restriction whatsoever on the valuation of ε-terms.”
[Giese & Ahrendt, 1999, p.177]
This is, however, not true because it imposes the restriction of a right-unique behavior,
which denies the possibility of an indefinite behavior, as we will see below.
Note that (E2) has a disastrous effect in intuitionistic logic. This is already the case
for its proper consequence εx. A0 6= εx. A1 ⇒ ¬(∀x.A0 ∧ ∀x.A1) which—together
with (ε0) and say “0 6=1”—turns every classical validity into an intuitionistic one.6 For the
strong consequences of the ε-formula in intuitionistic logic, cf. our Note 4.
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3.1.2 Roots of the Right-Uniqueness Requirement
The omnipresence of the right-uniqueness requirement may have its historical justification
in the fact that if we expand the dots “. . . ” in the quotation preceding Example 2.2 in § 2.2,
the full quotation reads:
\DaŊ ε-Symbol bildet somit eine Art der Verallgemeinerung deŊ µ-SymbolŊ fđr einen beliebigen In-
dividuŚnbereiĚ. Der Form naĚ Ćellt eŊ eine Funktion eineŊ variablen PrĽdikateŊ dar, welĚeŊ auer
demjenigen Argument, auf welĚeŊ siĚ die zu dem ε-Symbol gehŹrige gebundene Variable bezieht, noĚ
freie Variable alŊ Argumente (\Parameter") enthalten kann. Der Wert dieser Funktion fđr ein be-
ĆimmteŊ PrĽdikat A (bei FeĆlegung der Parameter) iĆ ein Ding deŊ IndividuŚnbereiĚŊ, und zwar
iĆ dieseŊ Ding gemĽ der inhaltliĚen UeberseŃung der Formel (ε0) ei n s o l Ě e Ŋ, au f
d a Ŋ j e n e Ŋ P r Ľ d i k a t A z u t r i Ď t, v o r au Ŋ g e s e Ń t, d a sŊ e Ŋ
đ b e r h au p t au f ei n D i n g d e Ŋ I n d i v i d u Ś n b e r ei Ě Ŋ z u t r i Ď t."
[Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70, Vol. II, p.12, modernized orthography]
“Thus, the ε-symbol forms a kind of generalization of the µ-symbol for arbitrary
universes. Syntactically, it provides a function of a variable predicate, which—
besides the argument to which the variable bound by the ε-symbol refers—may
contain free variables as arguments (“parameters”). The value of this function
for a given predicate A (for fixed values of the parameters) is an object of the
universe for which—according to the semantical translation of the formula (ε0)—
the predicate A holds, provided that A holds for any object of the universe at all.”
(our translation)
(“Syntactically” may be replaced with “Structurally”)
Here the word “function” could be understood in its mathematical sense to denote a (right-)
unique relation. And, what kind of function could it be but a choice function, choosing an
element from the set of objects that satisfy A ? Accordingly, at a different place, we read:
\Darđber hinauŊ hat daŊ ε die Rolle der AuŊwahlfunktion, d. h. im Falle, wo Aa auf mehrere
Dinge zutreĎen kann, iĆ εA i r g e n d ei n e Ŋ von den Dingen a, auf welĚe Aa zutriĎt."
[Hilbert, 1928, p. 68]
“Beyond that, the ε has the rôle of the choice function, i.e. in the case where
Aa may hold for several objects, εA is an arbitrary one of the objects a for
which Aa holds.” (our translation)
(in more modern notation, we would possibly write
“A(a)” for “Aa” and “εx.(A(x))” for “εA”)
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3.1.3 Universal and Generalized Choice Functions
Since—in [Hilbert, 1923a, one but last paragraph]—David Hilbert himself seems to have
confused the consequences of the ε on the Axiom of Choice (cf. [Rubin & Rubin, 1985],
[Howard & Rubin, 1998]), we point out: Although the ε supplies us with a syntactical
means for expressing a universal choice function, the axioms (E2), (ε0), (ε1), and (ε2) do
not imply the Axiom of Choice in set theories, unless the axiom schemes of Replacement
(Collection) and Comprehension (Separation, Subset) also range over expressions containing
the ε; cf. [Leisenring, 1969], § IV 4.4.
Moreover, to be precise, the notion of a “choice function” must be generalized here
because we need a total function on the power set of any (non-empty) universe. Thus,
a value must be supplied even at the empty set: f is defined to be a generalized choice
function if f : dom(f)→
⋃
(dom(f)) and ∀x∈ dom(f). (x= ∅ ∨ f(x)∈ x).
3.1.4 Hans Hermes’ (ε5) and David DeVidi’s (vext)
In [Hermes, 1965, p.18], the ε suffers from some overspecification in addition to (E2):
εx. false = εx. true (ε5)
This sets the value of the generalized choice function f at the empty set to the value of f
at the whole universe. For classical logic, we can combine (E2) and (ε5) into the following
axiom of [DeVidi, 1995] for “very extensional” semantics:
∀x.
(
(∃y. A0{x7→y} ⇒ A0)
⇔ (∃y. A1{x7→y} ⇒ A1)
)
⇒ εx. A0 = εx. A1 (vext)
Indeed, (vext) implies (E2) and (ε5). The other direction, however, does not hold for
intuitionistic logic, where, roughly speaking, (vext) additionally implies that if the same
elements make A0 and A1 as true as possible, then the ε-operator picks the same element of
this set, even if the suprema ∃y. A0{x7→y} and ∃y. A1{x7→y} (in the complete Heyting
algebra) are not equally true.
3.1.5 Completeness Aspirations of Leisenring and Asser
Different possible choices for the value of the generalized choice function f at the empty
set are discussed in [Leisenring, 1969], but as the consequences of any special choice are
quite queer, the only solution that is found to be sufficiently adequate in [Leisenring, 1969]
is to consider validity in any model given by each generalized choice function on the power
set of the universe. Notice, however, that even in this case, in each single model, the value
of εx. A is still functionally dependent on the extension of A. Roughly speaking, in
[Leisenring, 1969] the axioms (ε1), and (ε2) from § 2.3 and (E2) from § 3.1.1 are shown to
be complete w.r.t. this semantics of the ε in first-order logic.
This completeness makes it unlikely that this semantics exactly matches Hilbert’s in-
tentions: Indeed, if Hilbert’s intended semantics for the ε could be completely captured by
adding the single and straightforward axiom (E2), this axiom would not have been omitted
in [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70]. It is my opinion that the reason for this omission is that
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Hilbert’s intentions for the ε were not right-unique but indefinite: If Hilbert had intended
a right-unique behavior, it would not be impossible to derive (E2) from his axiomatization!
Completeness—detached from practical usefulness, but the theoreticians’ favorite
puzzle—has misled others, too: In [Asser, 1957] the objective is to find a semantics such
that Hilbert’s ε-calculus of [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70] is sound and complete for it. This
semantics, however, has to depend on the details of the syntactical form of the ε-terms and,
moreover, turns out to be necessarily so artificial that in [Asser, 1957] the author himself
does not recommend it and admits not to believe that Hilbert could have intended it:
\AllerdingŊ iĆ dieser BegriĎ von AuŊwahlfunktion so kompliziert, dasŊ siĚ seine Verwendung in der
inhaltliĚen Mathematik kaum empfiehlt." [Asser, 1957, p. 59, modernized orthography]
“This notion of a choice function, however,” (i.e. the type-3 choice function,
providing a semantics for the ε-operator) “is so intricate that its application in
informal mathematics is hardly to be recommended.” (our translation)
(“informal mathematics” may be replaced with “intuitive mathematics”,
“naïve mathematics”, or “mathematics with semantical contents”)
\AngesiĚtŊ der Kompliziertheit deŊ BegriĎŊ der AuŊwahlfunktion dritter Art ergibt siĚ die Frage, ob bei
Hilbert-BernayŊ (" . . . \) wirkliĚ beabsiĚtigt war, diesen BegriĎ von AuŊwahlfunktion axiomatisĚ zu
besĚreiben. AuŊ der DarĆellung bei Hilbert-BernayŊ glaube iĚ entnehmen zu kŹnnen, dasŊ daŊ niĚt der
Fall iĆ," [Asser, 1957, p. 65, modernized orthography]
“The intricacy of the notion of the type-3 choice function puts up the question
whether the intention in [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70] (” . . . “) really was to
describe this notion axiomatically. I believe I can draw from the presentation
in [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70] that that is not the case,” (our translation)
3.1.6 My Assumption on Hilbert’s Intentions
The statements of Bernays and Hilbert in German language cited in § 3.1.2 are ambiguous
with respect to the question of an intended (right-) unique behavior of the ε-operator.
Hilbert probably wanted to have what today we call “committed choice”, but simply used
the word “function” for the following three reasons: Hilbert was not too much interested in
semantics anyway. The technical term “committed choice” did not exist at Hilbert’s time.
Last but not least, right-uniqueness conveniently serves as a global commitment to any
choice and thereby avoids the problem illustrated in Example 2.5 of § 2.6.
But the price we would have to pay for such an overspecification is high: Right-
Uniqueness restricts operationalization (cf. § 4.6) and applicability: Cf. e.g. [Geurts, 2000]
and our § 6.5 for the price of right-uniqueness in capturing the semantics of sentences in
natural language.
And what we are going to show in this paper is that there is no reason to pay that price!
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3.2 Indefinite Semantics in the Literature
The only occurrences of an indefinite semantics for Hilbert’s ε in the literature seem to be
[Blass & Gurevich, 2000] and the references there.
Consider the formula εx. (x=x) = εx. (x=x) from [Blass & Gurevich, 2000] or the
even simpler
εx. true = εx. true (Reflex)
which may be valid or not, depending on the question whether the same object is taken on
both sides of the equation or not. In natural language this like
“Something is equal to something.”
whose truth is indefinite. If you do not think so, consider εx. true 6= εx. true in addition,
i.e. “Something is unequal to something.”, and notice that the two sentences seem to be
contradictory.
In [Blass & Gurevich, 2000], Kleene’s strong three-valued logic is taken as a mathemat-
ically elegant means to solve the problems with indefiniteness. In spite of the theoretical
significance of this solution, however, from a practical point of view, Kleene’s strong three-
valued logic severely restricts its applicability. In applications, a logic is not an object of
investigation but a meta-logical tool, and logical arguments are never made explicit because
the presence of logic is either not realized at all or taken to be trivial, even by academics
(unless they are formalists), cf. e.g. [Pinkal &al., 2001, p.14f.], for Wizard of Oz studies with
young students. Thus, regarding applications, we have to stick to our common meta-logic,
which in the western world is a subset of (modal) classical logic. A western court may
accept that Lee Harvey Oswald killed John F. Kennedy as well as that he did not; but
cannot accept a third possibility, a tertium, as required for Kleene’s strong three-valued
logic, and especially not the interpretation given in [Blass & Gurevich, 2000] that he both
did and did not kill him, which directly contradicts any common sense.
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4 Introduction to Our Novel Indefinite Free-Variable
Semantics
4.1 Free γ- and Free δ-Variables
Before we can introduce to our treatment of the ε, we have to provide some technical
background. Cf. [Wirth, 2004] for a technically more detailed introduction.
In this § 4.1, we will introduce free γ-, δ−-, and δ+-variables. Free variables frequently
occur in mathematical practice. Their logical function varies locally. It is typically deter-
mined implicitly by the context and the obviously intended semantics.
In this paper, however, we make this function explicit by using disjoint sets of variable-
symbols for different functions. The classification of a free variable is indicated by adjoining
the respective γ, δ−, or δ+ to the upper right of the symbol for the variable.
As already noted in [Russell, 1919, p.155], in mathematical practice, the free variables
afree and bfree in the (quasi-) formula
(afree + bfree)2 = (afree)2 + 2 afree bfree + (bfree)2
obviously have a universal intention and the quasi-formula itself is not meant to denote a
propositional function but actually stands for the closed formula
∀a, b.
(
(a+ b)2 = (a)2 + 2 a b+ (b)2
)
In this paper, however, we indicate by
(aδ + bδ )2 = (aδ )2 + 2 aδ bδ + (bδ )2
a proper formula with free δ−-variables, which—independently of its context—is logically
equivalent to the universally quantified formula.
Changing from universal to existential intention, it is somehow clear that the linear system(
2 3
5 7
)(
xfree
yfree
)
=
(
11
13
)
asks us to find solutions for xfree and yfree. We make this intention syntactically explicit by
writing (
2 3
5 7
)(
xγ
yγ
)
=
(
11
13
)
instead. This formula with free γ-variables is not only logically equivalent to
∃x, y.
( (
2 3
5 7
)(
x
y
)
=
(
11
13
) )
but may additionally enable us to retrieve the solutions for xγ and yγ as the substitutions
for xγ and yγ chosen in a formal proof.
Finally, the free δ+-variables are to represent our ε-terms in the end. The names γ,
δ−, and δ+ refer to the classification of reductive inference rules into α-, β-, γ-, and δ-rules
of [Smullyan, 1968], as used in the following § 4.2.
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4.2 γ- and δ-Rules
Suppose we want to prove the existential property ∃x.A. The γ-rules of old-fashioned
inference systems (such as [Gentzen, 1935] or [Smullyan, 1968], e.g.) require us to choose a
fixed witnessing term t as a substitute for the bound variable immediately when eliminating
the quantifier.
Let A be a formula. We do not permit binding of variables that already occur bound
in a term or formula; that is: ∀x. A is only a formula if no binder on x already occurs
in A. The simple effect is that our formulas are easier to read and our γ- and δ-rules can
replace all occurrences of x. Moreover, we assume that all binders have minimal scope, e.g.
∀x, y. A ∧ B reads (∀x. ∀y. A) ∧ B. Let Γ and Π be sequents, i.e. disjunctive lists of
formulas.
γ-rules: Let t be any term:
Γ ∃x.A Π
A{x7→t} Γ ∃x.A Π
Γ ¬∀x.A Π
A{x7→t} Γ ¬∀x.A Π
Note that A is the conjugate of the formula A, i.e. B if A is of the form ¬B, and ¬A
otherwise. Moreover, in the good old days when trees grew upwards, Gerhard Gentzen
(1909–1945) would have inverted the inference rules such that passing the line means con-
sequence. In our case, passing the line means reduction, and trees grow downwards.
More modern inference systems, however, (such as the ones in [Fitting, 1996]) enable us
to delay the crucial choice of the term t until the state of the proof attempt may provide
more information to make a successful decision. This delay is achieved by introducing a
special kind of variable, called “dummy” in [Prawitz, 1960], “free” in [Fitting, 1996] and in
Footnote 11 of [Prawitz, 1960], and “meta” in the field of planning and constraint solving.
We call these variables free γ-variables and write them like xγ. When these additional
variables are available, we can reduce ∃x.A first to A{x7→xγ} and then sometime later
in the proof we may globally substitute xγ with an appropriate term.
The addition of the free γ-variables changes the notion of a term but not the γ-rules,
whereas it becomes visible in the δ-rules. δ-rules introduce free δ-variables. The free
δ-variables are also called “parameters” or “eigenvariables” and typically stand for arbitrary
objects of which nothing is known. Now the occurrence of such a free δ-variable must
be disallowed in the terms that may be substituted for those free γ-variables which have
already been in use when an application of a δ-rule introduced this free δ-variable. The
reason for this restriction of substitution for free γ-variables is that the dependence or
scoping of the quantifiers must somehow be reflected in a dependence of the free variables.
This dependence is to be captured in a binary relation on the free variables, called vari-
able-condition.
Indeed, it is sometimes unsound to instantiate a free γ-variable xγ with a term containing
a free δ-variable yδ that was introduced later than xγ:
17
Example 4.1 The formula ∃x. ∀y. (x= y)
is not generally valid. We can start a proof attempt as follows:
γ-step: ∀y. (xγ= y), ∃x. ∀y. (x= y)
δ-step: (xγ= yδ), ∃x. ∀y. (x= y)
Now, if the free γ-variable xγ could be substituted by the free δ-variable yδ, we would get
the tautology (yδ= yδ), i.e. we would have proved an invalid formula. To prevent this, the
δ-step has to record (xγ, yδ) in a variable-condition, where (xγ, yδ) means that xγ is somehow
“necessarily older” than yδ, so that we must not instantiate the free γ-variable xγ with a
term containing the free δ-variable yδ.
Starting with an empty variable-condition, we extend the variable-condition during a proof
by δ-steps and by steps that globally instantiate γ- and δ+-variables. This kind of instanti-
ation of rigid variables is only sound if the resulting variable-condition is still acyclic after
adding, for each free variable xfree instantiated with a term t and for each free variable zfree
occurring in t, the pair (zfree, xfree) to the variable-condition.
To make things more complicated, there are basically two different versions of the δ-rules:
standard δ−-rules (also simply called “δ-rules”) and δ+-rules (also called “ liberalized δ-rules”).
They differ in the kind of free δ-variable they introduce and—crucially—in the way they
enlarge the variable-condition, depicted to the lower right of the bar:
δ−-rules: Let xδ be a new free δ−-variable:
Γ ∀x.A Π
A{x7→xδ } Γ Π Vγδ+(Γ ∀x.A Π)× {x
δ }
Γ ¬∃x.A Π
A{x7→xδ } Γ Π Vγδ+(Γ ¬∃x.A Π)× {x
δ }
δ+-rules: Let xδ+ be a new free δ+-variable:
Γ ∀x.A Π {(xδ+, A{x7→xδ+} )}
A{x7→xδ+} Γ Π Vfree(∀x.A)× {x
δ+}
Γ ¬∃x.A Π {(xδ+, A{x7→xδ+})}
A{x7→xδ+} Γ Π Vfree(¬∃x.A)× {x
δ+}
Notice that Vγδ+(Γ ∀x.A Π) denotes the set of the free γ- and δ+-variables occurring in the
whole upper sequent, whereas Vfree(∀x.A) denotes the set of all free (γ-, δ−-, δ+-) variables,
but only the ones occurring in the principal formula ∀x.A. The smaller variable-condi-
tions generated by the δ+-rules mean more proofs. Indeed, the δ+-rules enable additional
proofs on the same level of multiplicity (i.e. the number of repeated γ-steps applied to the
identical principal formula); cf. e.g. [Wirth, 2004, Example 2.8, p. 21]. For certain classes of
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theorems, some of these proofs are exponentially and even non-elementarily shorter than the
shortest proofs which apply only δ−-rules; for a survey cf. [Wirth, 2004, § 2.1.5]. Moreover,
the δ+-rules provide additional proofs that are not only shorter but also more natural and
easier to find both automatically and for human beings; cf. the discussion on design goals
for inference systems in [Wirth, 2004, § 1.2.1], and the proof of the limit theorem for + in
[Wirth, 2006]. All in all, the name “liberalized” for the δ+-rules is indeed justified: They
provide more freedom to the prover.7
Moreover, note that the singleton sets indicated to the upper right of the bar of the
above δ+-rules are to augment another global binary relation besides the variable-condi-
tion, namely a function called the choice-condition. This will be explained in § 4.5f.
There is a popular alternative to variable-conditions, namely Skolemization, where the
free δ-variables become functions (i.e. their order is incremented) and the δ−- and δ+-
rules give them the free γ-variables of Vγ(Γ ∀x.A Π) and Vγ(∀x.A), resp., as initial
arguments. Then, the occur-check of unification implements the restrictions on substitution
of free γ-variables. In some inference systems, however, Skolemization is unsound (e.g. for
higher-order systems such as the one in [Kohlhase, 1998] or the system in [Wirth, 2004] for
descente infinie) or inappropriate (e.g. in the matrix systems of [Wallen, 1990]). We prefer
inference systems with variable-conditions as this is a simpler, more general, and not less
efficient approach compared to Skolemizing inference systems. Notice that variable-condi-
tions do not add unnecessary complexity: Firstly, if variable-conditions are superfluous we
can work with an empty variable-condition as if there would be no variable-condition at
all. Secondly, we will need the variable-conditions anyway for our choice-conditions, which
again are needed to formalize our novel approach to Hilbert’s ε-operator.
4.3 Quantifier Elimination and Subordinate ε-terms
Before we can introduce to our treatment of the ε, we also have to get more acquainted
with the ε in general.
The elimination of ∀- and ∃-quantifiers with the help of ε-terms (cf. § 2.3) may be more
difficult than expected when some ε-terms become “subordinate” to others.
Definition 4.2 (Subordinate) An ε-term εv. B (or, more generally, a binder on v
together with its scope B) is superordinate to an (occurrence of an) ε-term εx. A if
1. εx. A is a subterm of B and
2. an occurrence of the variable v in εx. A is free in B
(i.e. the binder on v binds an occurrence of v in εx. A ).
An (occurrence of an) ε-term a is subordinate to an ε-term εv. B (or, more generally, a
binder on v together with its scope B) if εv. B is superordinate to a.
In [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70, Vol. II, p. 24], these subordinate ε-terms, which are re-
sponsible for the difficulty to prove the ε-theorems constructively, are called “untergeordnete
ε-AuŊdrđĘe”. Note that we do not use a special name for ε-terms with free occurrences of
variables—such as “ε-Ausdrücke” (“quasi ε-terms”) instead of “ε-Terme” (“ε-terms”)—but
simply call them “ε-terms”, too.
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Example 4.3 (Quantifier Elimination and Subordinate ε-Terms)
Consider the formula ∀x. ∃y. ∀z. P(x, y, z). Let us apply (ε1) and (ε2) from § 2.3 to remove
the three quantifiers completely. We introduce the following abbreviations:
za(x)(y) = εz. ¬P(x, y, z)
ya(x) = εy. P(x, y, za(x)(y))
yb(x) = εy. ∀z. P(x, y, z)
xa = εx. ¬P(x, ya(x), za(x)(ya(x)))
xb = εx. ¬P(x, ya(x), za(x)(yb(x)))
xc = εx. ¬P(x, yb(x), za(x)(yb(x)))
xd = εx. ¬∀z. P(x, yb(x), z)
xe = εx. ¬∃y. ∀z. P(x, y, z)
When we eliminate inside–out (i.e. start with the elimination of ∀z.) the transformation is
∀x. ∃y. P(x, y, za(x)(y)), ∀x. P(x, ya(x), za(x)(ya(x))), P(xa, ya(xa), za(xa)(ya(xa)))
When we eliminate outside–in (i.e. start with the elimination of ∀x.) the transformation is
∃y. ∀z. P(xe, y, z), ∀z. P(xe, yb(xe), z), P(xe, yb(xe), za(xe)(yb(xe))),
. . . , P(xa, ya(xa), za(xa)(ya(xa)))
where the dots represent the rewritings of xe over xd, xc, xb to xa (four times) and of yb to
ya (twice in addition).
Note that the resulting formula is the same in both cases. Indeed, it does not depend
on the order in which we eliminate the quantifiers. Moreover, notice that this formula is
quite deep. Indeed, in general n nested quantifiers result in an ε-nesting depth of 2n−1 and
huge ε-terms (such as xa) occur up to n times with commitment to their choice. Let us
have a closer look to see this. If we write the resulting formula as
P(xa, yc, zd) (4.3.1)
by setting yc = ya(xa), and zd = za(xa)(ya(xa)), then we have
zd = εz. ¬P(xa, yc, z) (4.3.2)
yc = εy. P(xa, y, zc(y)) (4.3.3)
with zc(y) = εz. ¬P(xa, y, z) (4.3.4)
xa = εx. ¬P(x, ya(x), zb(x)) (4.3.5)
with zb(x) = εz. ¬P(x, ya(x), z)
and ya(x) = εy. P(x, y, za(x)(y))
with za(x)(y) = εz. ¬P(x, y, z)
(4.3.6)
(4.3.7)
(4.3.8)
Firstly, note that the free variables x and y in the ε-terms zc(y), zb(x), ya(x), za(x)(y)
are actually bound by the next ε to the left, to which the respective ε-terms thus become
subordinate. For example, the ε-term zc(y) is subordinate to the ε-term yc. Secondly, the
top ε-binders on the right-hand sides of the defining equations are exactly those that require
a commitment to their choice. This means that each of za, zb, zc, zd and each of ya, yc
may be chosen differently without affecting soundness of the equivalence transformation.
Note that the variables are strictly nested into each other. Thus we must choose in the
order of za, ya, zb, xa, zc, yc, zd. Moreover, for zc, zb, ya, za we actually have to choose a
function instead of a simple value. In Hilbert’s view, however, there are neither functions
nor objects at all, but only terms, where xa reads
εx. ¬P


x,
εyα.P(x, yα, εzα.¬P(x, yα, zα)),
εzβ.¬P
(
x, εyα.P(x, yα, εzα.¬P(x, yα, zα)), zβ
)
,


and yc and zd take several lines more to write them down.
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For ∀x. ∀y. ∀z. P(x, y, z) instead of ∀x. ∃y. ∀z. P(x, y, z), we get the same exponential
growth of nesting depth as in Example 4.3 above, when we completely eliminate the quan-
tifiers using (ε2). The only difference is that we get additional occurrences of ‘¬’ in ya, yb,
and yc. But when we have quantifiers of the same kind like ‘∃’ or ‘∀’, we had better choose
them in parallel, e.g., for ∀x. ∀y. ∀z. P(x, y, z) we choose va := εv. ¬P(1st(v), 2nd(v), 3rd(v)),
and then take P(1st(va), 2nd(va), 3rd(va)) as result of the elimination.
Roughly speaking, in today’s theorem proving, cf. e.g. [Fitting, 1996], [Wirth, 2004],
the exponential explosion of term depth of Example 4.3 is avoided by an outside–in removal
of δ-quantifiers without removing the quantifiers below ε-binders and by a replacement
of γ-quantified variables with free γ-variables. For the case of Example 4.3, this yields
P(xe, y
γ, ze) with ze = εz. ¬P(xe, yγ, z) and xe = εx. ¬∃y. ∀z. P(x, y, z). Thus, in
general, the nesting of binders for the complete elimination of a prenex of n quantifiers
does not become deeper than 1
4
(n+1)2.
Moreover, if we are only interested in reduction and not in equivalence transformation
of a formula, we can abstract Skolem terms from the ε-terms and just reduce to the formula
P(xδ, yγ, zδ(yγ)). In a non-Skolemizing inference system with a variable-condition we get
P(xδ, yγ, zδ) instead, with {(yγ, zδ)} as an extension to the variable-condition. Note that
with Skolemization or variable-conditions we have no growth of nesting depth at all, and
the same will be the case for our approach to ε-terms.
4.4 Do not be afraid of Indefiniteness!
From the discussion in § 2.5 and § 3, one could get the impression that an indefinite logical
treatment of the ε is not easy to find. Indeed, on the first sight, there is the problem that
some standard axiom schemes cannot be taken for granted, such as substitutability
s= t ⇒ f(s)= f(t)
(note that this is similar to (E2) of § 3.1.1 when we take logical equivalence as equality!)
and such as reflexivity
t= t
(note that (Reflex) of § 3.2 is an instance of this!)
This means that it is not definitely okay to replace a subterm with an equal term and
that even syntactically equal terms may not be definitely equal.
It may be interesting to see that—in computer programs—we are quite used to commit-
ted choice and to an indefinite behavior of choosing, and that the violation of substitutability
and even reflexivity is no problem there:
Example 4.4 (Violation of Substitutability and Reflexivity in Programs)
In the implementation of the specification of the web-based hypertext system of [Mattick
& Wirth, 1999] we needed a function that chooses an element from a set implemented as a
list. Its ml code is
fun choose s = case s of Set (i :: _) => i | _ => raise Empty;
And, of course, it simply returns the first element of the list. For another set that is
equal—but where the list may have another order—the result may be different. Thus, the
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behavior of the function choose is indefinite for a given set, but any time it is called for
an implemented set, it chooses a special element and commits to this choice, i.e. when
called again, it returns the same value. In this case we have choose s = choose s, but
s = t does not imply choose s = choose t. In an implementation where some parallel
reordering of lists may take place, even choose s = choose s may be wrong.
From this example we may learn that the question of choose s = choose s may be
indefinite until the choice steps have actually been performed. This is exactly how we will
treat our ε. The steps that are performed in logic are proof steps.
Thus, on the one hand, when we want to prove
εx. true = εx. true
we can choose 0 for both occurrences of εx. true, get 0= 0, and the proof is successful.
On the other hand, when we want to prove
εx. true 6= εx. true
we can choose 0 for one occurrence and 1 for the other, get 0 6= 1, and the proof is successful
again. This procedure may seem wondrous again, but is very similar to something quite
common with free γ-variables, cf. § 4.1: On the one hand, when we want to prove
xγ= yγ
we can choose 0 to substitute for both xγ and yγ, get 0= 0, and the proof is successful.
On the other hand, when we want to prove
xγ 6= yγ
we can choose 0 to substitute for xγ and 1 to substitute for yγ, get 0 6= 1, and the proof is
successful again.
4.5 Replacing ε-terms with Free δ+-Variables
There is an important difference between the inequations εx. true 6= εx. true and xγ 6= yγ
at the end of the previous § 4.4: The latter does not violate the reflexivity axiom! And we
are going to cure the violation of the former immediately with the help of a special kind of
free variables, namely our free δ+-variables, cf. § 4.1. Now, instead of εx. true 6= εx. true
we write xδ+ 6= yδ+ and remember what these free δ+-variables stand for by storing this into
a function C, called a choice-condition:
C(xδ
+
) := true,
C(yδ
+
) := true.
For a first step, suppose that our ε-terms are not subordinate to any outside binder, cf. Defi-
nition 4.2. Then, we can replace an ε-term εz. A with a new free δ+-variable zδ+ and extend
the partial function C by
C(zδ
+
) := A{z 7→zδ+}.
By this procedure we can eliminate all ε-terms without loosing any syntactical information.
As a first consequence of this elimination, the substitutability and reflexivity axioms are
immediately regained, and the problems discussed in § 4.4 disappear.
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A second reason for replacing the ε-terms with free δ+-variables is that the latter can
solve the question whether a committed choice is required: We can express—on the one
hand—a committed choice by using a single free δ+-variable and—on the other hand—a
choice without commitment by using several variables with the same choice-condition.
Indeed, this also solves our problems with committed choice of Example 2.5 of § 2.6:
Now, again using (ε1), ∃x. (x 6= x) reduces to xδ
+ 6= xδ+ with
C(xδ
+
) := (xδ
+ 6= xδ+)
and the proof attempt immediately fails due to the now regained reflexivity axiom.
As the second step, we still have to explain what to do with subordinate ε-terms. If the
ε-term εz. A contains free occurrences of exactly the distinct variables v0, . . . , vl−1, then
we have to replace this ε-term with the application term zδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) of the same type
as z (for a new free δ+-variable zδ+) and to extend the choice-condition C by
C(zδ
+
) := λv0. . . . λvl−1.
(
A{z 7→ zδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1)}
)
.
Example 4.5 (Higher-Order Choice-Condition) (continuing Example 4.3 of § 4.3)
In our framework, the complete elimination of ε-terms in (4.3.1) of Example 4.3 results in
P(xδ
+
a , y
δ+
c , z
δ+
d ) (cf. (4.3.1)!)
with the following higher-order choice-condition:
C(zδ
+
d ) := ¬P(x
δ+
a , y
δ+
c , z
δ+
d ) (cf. (4.3.2)!)
C(yδ
+
c ) := P(x
δ+
a , y
δ+
c , z
δ+
c (y
δ+
c )) (cf. (4.3.3)!)
C(zδ
+
c ) := λy. ¬P(x
δ+
a , y, z
δ+
c (y)) (cf. (4.3.4)!)
C(xδ
+
a ) := ¬P(x
δ+
a , y
δ+
a (x
δ+
a ), z
δ+
b (x
δ+
a )) (cf. (4.3.5)!)
C(zδ
+
b ) := λx. ¬P(x, y
δ+
a (x), z
δ+
b (x)) (cf. (4.3.6)!)
C(yδ
+
a ) := λx. P(x, y
δ+
a (x), z
δ+
a (x)(y
δ+
a (x))) (cf. (4.3.7)!)
C(zδ
+
a ) := λx. λy. ¬P(x, y, z
δ+
a (x)(y)) (cf. (4.3.8)!)
Notice that this representation of (4.3.1) is smaller and easier to understand than all previ-
ous ones. Indeed, by combination of λ-abstraction and term sharing via free δ+-variables,
in our framework the ε becomes practically feasible for the first time.
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4.6 Instantiating Free δ+-Variables (“ε-Substitution”)
Having realized Requirement I (Syntax) of § 1 in the previous § 4.5, in this § 4.6 we are now
going to explain how to satisfy Requirement II (Reasoning). To this end, we have to explain
how to replace free δ+-variables with terms that satisfy their choice-conditions.
The first thing to know about free δ+-variables is: Just like the free γ-variables and
contrary to free δ−-variables, the free δ+-variables are rigid in the sense that the only way
to replace a free δ+-variable is to do it globally , i.e. in all formulas and all choice-conditions
in an atomic transaction.
In reductive theorem proving such as in sequent, tableau, or matrix calculi we are in the
following situation: While a free γ-variable xγ can be replaced with nearly everything, the
replacement of a free δ+-variable yδ+ requires some proof work, and a free δ−-variable zδ
cannot be instantiated at all.
Contrariwise, when formulas are used as tools instead of tasks, free δ−-variables can
indeed be replaced—and this even locally (i.e. non-rigidly). This is the case not only for
purely generative calculi, such as resolution and paramodulation calculi and Hilbert-style
calculi such as the predicate calculus of [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70], but also for the
lemma and induction hypothesis application in the otherwise reductive calculi of [Wirth,
2004], cf. [Wirth, 2004, § 2.5.2].
More precisely—again considering reductive theorem proving, where formulas are proof
tasks—a free γ-variable xγ may be instantiated with any term (of appropriate type) that
does not violate the current variable-condition, cf. § 5.2 for details. The instantiation of a
free δ+-variable yδ+ additionally requires some proof work depending on the current choice-
condition C, which also puts some requirements on the variable-condition R and thus is
formally called an R-choice-condition, cf. Definition 5.9 for the formal details. In general,
if a substitution σ replaces—possibly among other free γ-variables and free δ+-variables—
the free δ+-variable yδ+ in the domain of the R-choice-condition C, then—to know that the
global instantiation of the whole proof forest with σ preserves its soundness—we have to
prove (QC(yδ
+
))σ, where QC is given as follows:
Definition 4.6 (QC)
For an R-choice-condition C, we let QC be a total function from dom(C) into the set of
single-formula sequents such that for each yδ+ ∈ dom(C) with C(yδ+) = λv0. . . . λvl−1. B
for a formula B, we have
QC(y
δ+) = ∀v0. . . .∀vl−1.
(
∃y. (B{yδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) 7→ y}) ⇒ B
)
for an arbitrary fresh bound variable y ∈ Vbound\V(C(yδ
+
)).
Note that QC(yδ
+
) is nothing but a formulation of axiom (ε0) from § 2.1.3 in our framework,
and Lemma5.19 states its validity.
It is an essential8 property of our choice-conditions that all occurrences of yδ+ in B
necessarily are of the form yδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1), cf. Definition 5.9(2). Therefore, the formula
QC(y
δ+) is logically equivalent to the formula
∀v0. . . .∀vl−1.
(
∃z. (B{yδ
+
7→z}) ⇒ B
)
for a new bound variable z of the same type as yδ+.
24
Example 4.7 (Predecessor Function)
Suppose that our domain is natural numbers and that yδ+(p1) has the choice-condition
C(yδ
+
(p1)) = λv. (v= y
δ+
(p1)(v)+1).
Then, before we may instantiate yδ+(p1) with the symbol p for the predecessor function speci-
fied by ∀x. (p(x+1)=x), we have to prove (Q(yδ+(p1))){y
δ+
(p1) 7→ p}, which reads as
∀v.
(
∃y. (v= y+1) ⇒ (v= p(v)+1)
)
,
and is valid in arithmetic.
Example 4.8 (Canossa 1077) (continuing Example 2.4)
The situation of Example 2.4 now reads
Holy Ghost = zδ
+
0 ∧ Joseph = z
δ+
1 (4.8.1)
with C(zδ+0 ) = Father(z
δ+
0 , Jesus),
and C(zδ+1 ) = Father(z
δ+
1 , Jesus).
This does not bring us into the old trouble with the Pope because nobody knows whether
zδ
+
0 = z
δ+
1 holds.
On the one hand, knowing (2.1.2) from Example 2.1 of § 2.1, we can prove (4.8.1) as fol-
lows: We first substitute zδ+0 with Holy Ghost because, for σ0 := {z
δ+
0 7→Holy Ghost}, we have
(C(zδ
+
0 ))σ0 and—a fortiori— (QC(z
δ+
0 ))σ0, which reads
∃z. Father(z, Jesus) ⇒ Father(Holy Ghost, Jesus);
and, analogously, substitute zδ+1 with Joseph because, for σ1 := {z
δ+
1 7→Joseph}, we have
(C(zδ
+
1 ))σ1 and—a fortiori— (QC(z
δ+
1 ))σ1. After these substitutions, (4.8.1) becomes the
tautology
Holy Ghost = Holy Ghost ∧ Joseph = Joseph
On the other hand, if we want to have trouble, we can apply the substitution
σ′ = {zδ+0 7→ Joseph, z
δ+
1 7→ Joseph}
to (4.8.1) because of (QC(zδ
+
0 ))σ
′ = (QC(z
δ+
1 ))σ1 = (QC(z
δ+
1 ))σ
′.
Then our task is to show
Holy Ghost = Joseph ∧ Joseph = Joseph
Note that this procedure is stupid already under the aspect of theorem proving alone.
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5 Formal Presentation of Our Indefinite Semantics
To satisfy Requirement III (Semantics) of § 1, in this § 5 we present our novel semantics for
the ε formally . This is required for precision and consistency. As consistency of our new
semantics is not trivial at all, technical rigor cannot be avoided. From § 4 the reader should
have a good intuition of our intended representation and semantics of the ε, free δ+-vari-
ables, and choice-conditions in our framework. § 5 organizes as follows: In § 5.2 and § 5.4 we
formalize variable-conditions and explain how to deal with free γ-variables syntactically and
semantically. In § 5.3 we introduce a preliminary semantics that does not treat free δ+-vari-
ables properly, and in § 5.6 the proper semantics. Only between these two §§ 5.3 and 5.6, we
can discuss choice-conditions (§ 5.5). Our interest goes beyond soundness in that we want
“preservation of solutions”. By this we mean the following: All closing substitutions for the
free γ-variables and free δ+-variables—i.e. all solutions that transform a proof attempt (to
which a proposition has been reduced) into a closed proof—are also solutions of the original
proposition. This is similar to a proof in Prolog, computing answers to a query proposition
that contains free γ-variables. Therefore, in § 5.7 we discuss this solution-preserving notion
of reduction, especially under the aspect of global instantiation of free δ+-variables. Finally,
in § 5.8 we give some hints on the design of operators similar to our ε. All in all, in this § 5,
we extend and simplify the presentation of [Wirth, 2004], which, however, additionally
contains comparative discussions, compatible extensions for descente infinie, and those
proofs that are omitted here.
5.1 Basic Notions and Notation
‘N’ denotes the set of natural numbers and ‘≺’ the ordering on N. Let N+ := { n∈N |
0 6=n }. We use ‘⊎’ for the union of disjoint classes and ‘id’ for the identity function. For
classes R, A, and B we define:
dom(R) := { a | ∃b. (a, b)∈R } domain
A↿R := { (a, b)∈R | a∈A } restriction to A
〈A〉R := { b | ∃a∈A. (a, b)∈R } image of A, i.e. 〈A〉R = ran(A↿R)
And the dual ones:
ran(R) := { b | ∃a. (a, b)∈R } range
R↾B := { (a, b)∈R | b∈B } range-restriction to B
R〈B〉 := { a | ∃b∈B. (a, b)∈R } reverse-image of B, i.e. R〈B〉 = dom(R↾B)
Furthermore, we use ‘∅’ to denote the empty set as well as the empty function. Functions
are (right-) unique relations and the meaning of ‘f◦g’ is extensionally given by (f◦g)(x) =
g(f(x)). The class of total functions from A to B is denoted as A → B. The class of
(possibly) partial functions from A to B is denoted as A❀ B. Both → and ❀ associate
to the right, i.e. A❀ B → C reads A❀ (B → C).
Let R be a binary relation. R is said to be a relation on A if dom(R) ∪ ran(R) ⊆ A.
R is irreflexive if id∩R = ∅. It is A-reflexive if A↿id ⊆ R. Speaking of a reflexive relation
we refer to the largest A that is appropriate in the local context, and referring to this A
we write R0 to ambiguously denote A↿id. With R1 := R, and Rn+1 := Rn◦R for n ∈ N+,
Rm denotes them-step relation forR. The transitive closure ofR is R+ :=
⋃
n∈N+
Rn. The
reflexive & transitive closure of R is R∗ :=
⋃
n∈NR
n. A relation R (on A) is well-founded
if any non-empty class B (⊆A) has an R-minimal element, i.e. ∃a∈B. ¬∃a′ ∈B. a′Ra.
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5.2 Variables and R-Substitutions
We assume the following four sets of symbols to be disjoint:
Vγ free γ-variables, i.e. the free variables of [Fitting, 1996]
Vδ free δ-variables, i.e. nullary parameters, instead of Skolem functions
Vbound bound variables, i.e. variables to be bound, cf. below
Σ constants, i.e. the function and predicate symbols from the signature
As explained in § 4.1, we partition the free δ-variables into free δ−-variables and free δ+-vari-
ables: Vδ = Vδ ⊎ Vδ+. We define the free variables by Vfree := Vγ ⊎ Vδ and the variables
by V := Vbound ⊎Vfree. Finally, the rigid variables by Vγδ+ := Vγ⊎Vδ+. We use ‘Vk(Γ )’ to
denote the set of variables from Vk occurring in Γ .
Let σ be a substitution. σ is a substitution on X if dom(σ) ⊆ X. We denote with ‘Γσ’
the result of replacing each occurrence of a variable x ∈ dom(σ) in Γ with σ(x). (Actually,
we may have to rename some of the bound variables in σ(x) when we exclude the binding of
a variable within the scope of a bound variable of the same name.) Unless otherwise stated,
we tacitly assume that all occurrences of variables from Vbound in a term or formula or in the
range of a substitution are bound occurrences (i.e. that a variable x ∈ Vbound occurs only in
the scope of a binder on x) and that each substitution σ satisfies dom(σ) ⊆ Vfree, so that
no bound occurrences of variables can be replaced and no additional variable occurrences
can become bound (i.e. captured) when applying σ.
Several binary relations on free variables will be introduced in this and the following §§.
The overall idea is that when (x, y) occurs in such a relation this means something like
“x is necessarily older than y” or “the value of y depends on x or is described in terms
of x”.
Definition 5.1 (Variable-Condition) A variable-condition is a subset of Vfree × Vfree.
Definition 5.2 (σ-Update) Let R be a variable-condition and σ be a substitution.
The σ-update of R is R ∪ { (zfree, xfree) | xfree ∈ dom(σ) ∧ zfree ∈Vfree(σ(xfree)) }.
Definition 5.3 (R-Substitution) Let R be a variable-condition.
σ is an R-substitution if σ is a substitution and the σ-update of R is well-founded.
Syntactically, (xfree, yfree)∈R is to express that an R-substitution σ must not replace xfree
with a term in which yfree could ever occur. This is guaranteed when the σ-updates R′ of R
are always required to be well-founded. For zfree ∈ Vfree(σ(xfree)), we get zfree R′ xfree R′ yfree,
blocking zfree against terms containing yfree. Note that in practice a σ-update of R can
always be chosen to be finite. In this case, it is well-founded iff it is acyclic.
5.3 R-Validity
Instead of defining validity from scratch, we require some abstract properties typically hold-
ing in two-valued semantics. Validity is given relative to some Σ-structure S, assigning a
non-empty universe (or “carrier”) to each type. For X ⊆ V we denote the set of total
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S-valuations of X (i.e. functions mapping variables to objects of the universe of S (respect-
ing types)) with
X→ S
and the set of (possibly) partial S-valuations of X with
X❀ S
For δ : X→ S we denote with ‘S⊎δ’ the extension of S to the variables of X. More pre-
cisely, we assume some evaluation function ‘eval’ such that eval(S⊎δ) maps any term whose
constants and freely occurring variables are from Σ⊎X into the universe of S (respecting
types) such that for all x ∈ X: eval(S⊎δ)(x) = δ(x). Moreover, eval(S⊎δ) maps any
formula B whose constants and freely occurring variables are from Σ⊎X to TRUE or FALSE,
such that B is valid in S⊎δ iff eval(S⊎δ)(B) =TRUE.
Notice that we leave open what our formulas and what our Σ-structures exactly are. The
latter can range from a first-order Σ-structure to a higher-order modal Σ-model, provided
that the following two standard textbook lemmas hold for a term or formula B (possibly
with some unbound occurrences of variables from Vbound) and a Σ-structure S with valua-
tion δ : V❀ S .
Explicitness Lemma
The value of the evaluation function on B depends only on the valuation of those variables
that actually occur freely in B; formally: For X being the set of variables that occur freely
in B, if X ⊆ dom(δ): eval(S⊎δ)(B) = eval(S ⊎ X↿δ)(B).
Substitution [Value] Lemma
Let σ be a substitution. If the variables that occur freely in Bσ belong to dom(δ), then:
eval(S⊎δ)(Bσ) = eval
(
S ⊎
(
( σ ⊎ V\dom(σ)↿id ) ◦ eval(S⊎δ)
) )(
B
)
.
We are now going to define a new notion of validity of sets of sequents, i.e. sets of lists
of formulas. As this new kind of validity depends on a variable-condition R, it is called
“R-validity”. It provides the free γ-variables with an existential semantics given by their val-
uation ǫ(e)(δ) : Vγ → S, and the free δ-variables with a universal semantics by δ : Vδ → S.
The definition is top-down and the function ǫ (having nothing to do with Hilbert’s ε) and
the notion of an (S, R)-valuation are to be explained in § 5.4, which also contains examples
illustrating R-Validity.
Definition 5.4 (R-Validity, K) Let R be a variable-condition. Let S be a Σ-structure
with valuation δ : V❀ S. Let G be a set of sequents.
G is R-valid in S if there is an (S, R)-valuation e such that G is (e,S)-valid.
G is (e,S)-valid if G is (δ′, e,S)-valid for all δ′ : Vδ → S .
G is (δ, e,S)-valid if G is valid in S ⊎ ǫ(e)(δ) ⊎ δ.
G is valid in S⊎δ if Γ is valid in S⊎δ for all Γ ∈ G.
A sequent Γ is valid in S⊎δ if there is some formula listed in Γ that is valid in S⊎δ.
Validity in a class of Σ-structures is understood as validity in each of the Σ-structures of
that class. If we omit the reference to a special Σ-structure we mean validity in some
fixed class K of Σ-structures, such as the class of all Σ-structures or the class of Herbrand
Σ-structures.
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5.4 (S, R)-Valuations
Let S be some Σ-structure. We now define semantical counterparts of our R-substitu-
tions on Vγ, which we will call “(S, R)-valuations”. As an (S, R)-valuation plays the rôle
of a raising function (a dual of a Skolem function as defined in [Miller, 1992]), it does
not simply map each free γ-variable directly to an object of S (of the same type), but
may additionally read the values of some free δ-variables under an S-valuation δ : Vδ → S.
More precisely, an (S, R)-valuation e takes some restriction of δ as a second argument,
say δ′ : Vδ❀ S with δ′ ⊆ δ. In short:
e : Vγ → (Vδ❀ S)❀ S.
Moreover, for each free γ-variable xγ, we require that the set dom(δ′) of free δ-variables
read by e(xγ) is identical for all δ. This identical set will be denoted with Se〈{xγ}〉 below.
Technically, we require that there is some “semantical relation” Se ⊆ Vδ×Vγ such that for
all xγ ∈ Vγ:
e(xγ) : (Se〈{x
γ}〉 → S)→ S.
This means that e(xγ) can read the value of yδ if and only if (yδ, xγ)∈Se. Note that, for
each e : Vγ → (Vδ❀ S)❀ S, at most one semantical relation exists, namely
Se := { (y
δ, xγ) | xγ∈Vγ ∧ y
δ∈ dom(
⋃
(dom(e(xγ)))) }.
In some of the following definitions we are slightly more general because we want to apply
the terminology not only to free γ-variables but also to free δ+-variables.
Definition 5.5 (Semantical Relation (Se)) The semantical relation for e is
Se := { (y, x) | x∈ dom(e) ∧ y ∈ dom(
⋃
(dom(e(x)))) }.
e is semantical if e is a partial function on V such that for all x ∈ dom(e):
e(x) : (Se〈{x}〉 → S)→ S.
Definition 5.6 ((S, R)-Valuation)
Let R be a variable-condition and let S be a Σ-structure. e is an (S, R)-valuation if
e : Vγ → (Vδ❀ S)❀ S, e is semantical, and R ∪ Se is well-founded.
Finally, we need the technical means to turn an (S, R)-valuation e together with a valua-
tion δ of the free δ-variables into a valuation ǫ(e)(δ) of the free γ-variables:
Definition 5.7 (ǫ)
We define the function ǫ : (V❀ (V❀ S)❀ S) → (V❀ S) → V ❀ S
for e : V❀ (V❀ S)❀ S, δ : V❀ S, x ∈ V
by ǫ(e)(δ)(x) := e(x)(Se〈{x}〉↿δ).
29
Example 5.8 (R-Validity) For xγ ∈ Vγ, yδ ∈ Vδ, the sequent xγ=yδ is ∅-valid in any S
because we can choose Se := Vδ×Vγ and e(xγ)(δ) := δ(yδ) for δ : Vδ → S, resulting in
ǫ(e)(δ)(xγ) = e(xγ)(Se〈{xγ}〉↿δ) = e(x
γ)(Vδ↿δ) = δ(y
δ). This means that ∅-validity of xγ=yδ
is the same as validity of ∀y. ∃x. x=y. Moreover, note that ǫ(e)(δ) has access to the
δ-value of yδ just as a raising function f for x in the raised (i.e. dually Skolemized) version
f(yδ)=yδ of ∀y. ∃x. x=y.
Contrary to this, for R := Vγ×Vδ, the same formula xγ=yδ is not R-valid in general
because then the required well-foundedness of R ∪ Se (cf. Definition 5.6) implies Se= ∅,
and the value of xγ cannot depend on δ(yδ) anymore, due to e(xγ)(Se〈{xγ}〉↿δ) = e(x
γ)(∅↿δ) =
e(xγ)(∅). This means that (Vγ×Vδ)-validity of xγ=yδ is the same as validity of ∃x. ∀y. x=y.
Moreover, note that ǫ(e)(δ) has no access to the δ-value of yδ just as a raising function c
for x in the raised version c=yδ of ∃x. ∀y. x=y.
For a more general example let G = { Ai,0 . . . Ai,ni−1 | i∈ I }, where for i ∈ I and
j≺ni the Ai,j are formulas with free γ-variables from e and free δ-variables from u. Then
(Vγ×Vδ)-validity of G means ∃e. ∀u. ∀i∈ I. ∃j≺ni. Ai,j
whereas ∅-validity of G means ∀u. ∃e. ∀i∈ I. ∃j≺ni. Ai,j
Also any other sequence of universal and existential quantifiers can be represented by
a variable-condition R, starting from the empty set and applying the δ-rules from § 4.2.
A translation of a variable-condition R into a sequence of quantifiers may, however, require
a strengthening of dependences, in the sense that a backwards translation would result in
a variable-condition R′ with R ( R′. This means that our framework can express logical
dependences more fine-grained than standard quantifiers.
5.5 Choice-Conditions
Definition 5.9 (Choice-Condition)
C is an R-choice-condition if R is a well-founded variable-condition and C is a partial
function from Vδ+ into the set of formula-valued λ-terms, such that for all yδ
+
∈ dom(C):
1. zfree R∗ yδ+ for all zfree ∈ Vfree(C(yδ
+
)), and
2. C(yδ+) is of the form λv0. . . . λvl−1. B, where
B is a formula whose freely occurring variables from Vbound
are among {v0, . . . , vl−1} ⊆ Vbound
and where, for v0 : α0, . . . , vl−1 : αl−1, we have
yδ
+
: α0 → · · · → αl−1 → αl for some type αl,
and any occurrence of yδ+ in B is of the form yδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1).
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Example 5.10 (Choice-Condition) (continuing Example 4.5)
(a) If R is a well-founded variable-condition that satisfies
zδ
+
a R y
δ+
a R z
δ+
b R x
δ+
a R z
δ+
c R y
δ+
c R z
δ+
d ,
then the C of Example 4.5 is an R-choice-condition, indeed.
(b) If some clever person would like to do the complete quantifier elimination of Exam-
ple 4.5 by
C ′(zδ
+
d ) := ¬P(x
δ+
a , y
δ+
c , z
δ+
d )
C ′(yδ
+
c ) := P(x
δ+
a , y
δ+
c , z
δ+
d )
C ′(xδ
+
a ) := ¬P(x
δ+
a , y
δ+
c , z
δ+
d )
then he would—among other things—need zδ+d R
+ yδ
+
c R
+ zδ
+
d , by Definition 5.9(1) due
to the values of C ′ at yδ+c and z
δ+
d . This renders R non-well-founded. Thus, this C
′
cannot be an R-choice-condition for any R. Note that the choices required by C ′ for
yδ
+
c and z
δ+
d are in an unsolvable conflict, indeed.
(c) For a more elementary example, take
C ′′(xδ
+
) := (xδ
+
= yδ
+
) C ′′(yδ
+
) := (xδ
+ 6= yδ+)
Then xδ+ and yδ+ form a vicious circle of conflicting choices for which no valuation
can be found that is compatible with C ′′, cf. Definition 5.11, Lemma5.12. But C ′′ is
no choice-condition at all because there is no well-founded variable-condition R that
could turn it into an R-choice-condition.
We now split our valuation δ : Vδ → S; while τ : Vδ → S valuates the free δ−-variables,
π valuates the remaining free δ+-variables. As the choices of π may depend on τ , the
technical realization is similar to that of the dependence of the (S, R)-valuations on the
free δ-variables, as described in § 5.4.
Definition 5.11 (Compatibility)
Let C be an R-choice-condition, S a Σ-structure, and e an (S, R)-valuation. π is (e,S)-
compatible with (C,R) if
1. π : Vδ+ → (Vδ ❀ S)❀ S is semantical (cf. Definition 5.5) and
R ∪ Se ∪ Spi is well-founded.
2. For all yδ+ ∈ dom(C) with C(yδ+) = λv0. . . . λvl−1. B for a formula B,
for all τ : Vδ → S, for all η : {yδ
+} → S, and for all χ : {v0, . . . , vl−1} → S,
setting δ := ǫ(π)(τ) ⊎ τ ⊎ χ and δ′ := η ⊎ V\{yδ+}↿δ (i.e. δ
′ is the η-variant of δ):
If B is (δ′, e,S)-valid, then B is also (δ, e,S)-valid.
Roughly speaking, Item1 of this definition requires—for similar reasons as before—that the
flow of information between variables expressed in R, e, and π is acyclic.
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To understand Item2, consider an R-choice-condition C := {(yδ+, λv0. . . . λvl−1. B)},
which restricts the value of yδ+ with the formula-valued λ-term λv0. . . . λvl−1. B. Then
C simply requires that a different choice for the ǫ(π)(τ)-value of yδ+ cannot give rise to the
validity of the formula B in S ⊎ ǫ(e)(δ) ⊎ δ. Or—in other words—that ǫ(π)(τ)(yδ+)
is chosen such that B becomes valid, whenever such a choice is possible. This is closely
related to Hilbert’s ε-operator in the sense that yδ+ is given the value of
λv0. . . . λvl−1. εy. (B{y
δ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) 7→ y})
for a fresh bound variable y.
As the choice for yδ+ depends on the other free variables of λv0. . . . λvl−1. B (i.e. the free
variables of λv0. . . . λvl−1. εy. (B{yδ
+
(v0) · · · (vl−1) 7→ y}) ), we included this dependence
into the transitive closure of the variable-condition R in Definition 5.9(1). Therefore, the
well-foundedness of R avoids the conflict of Example 5.10(c).
Note that the empty function ∅ is an R-choice-condition for any well-founded variable-
condition R. Furthermore, any π with π : Vδ+ → {∅} → S is (e,S)-compatible with (∅, R)
due to Spi = ∅. Indeed, as stated in the following lemma, a compatible π always exists. This
is due to Definition 5.9(1) and the well-foundedness of R∪Se (according to Definition 5.6)
and due to the restriction on the occurrence of yδ+ in B in Definition 5.9(2).
Lemma 5.12 If C is an R-choice-condition, S a Σ-structure, and e an (S, R)-valua-
tion, then there is some π that is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R).
Just like the variable-condition R, the R-choice-condition C may grow during proofs. This
kind of extension together with a simple soundness condition plays an important rôle in
inference:
Definition 5.13 (Extension) (C ′, R′) is an extension of (C,R) if C is an R-choice-
condition, C ′ is an R′-choice-condition, C⊆C ′, and R⊆R′.
Lemma 5.14 (Extension) Let (C ′, R′) be an extension of (C,R).
If e is an (S, R′)-valuation and π is (e,S)-compatible with (C ′, R′),
then e is also an (S, R)-valuation and π is also (e,S)-compatible with (C,R).
After global application of an R-substitution σ we now have to update both R and C:
Definition 5.15 (Extended σ-Update) Let C be an R-choice-condition and let σ be
a substitution. The extended σ-update (C ′, R′) of (C,R) is given by:
C ′ := { (x,Bσ) | (x,B)∈C ∧ x 6∈ dom(σ) },
R′ is the σ-update of R, cf. Definition 5.2.
Lemma 5.16 (Extended σ-Update) If C is an R-choice-condition, σ an R-substitu-
tion, and if (C ′, R′) is the extended σ-update of (C,R), then C ′ is an R′-choice-condition.
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5.6 (C,R)-Validity
While the notion of R-validity (cf. Definition 5.4) already provides the free γ-variables
with an existential semantics, it fails to give the free δ+-variables the proper semantics
according to an R-choice-condition C. This deficiency is overcome in the following notion of
“(C,R)-validity”, which—roughly speaking—requires the following: For arbitrary values of
the free δ−-variables, we must be able to choose values for the free δ+-variables satisfying C,
and then we must be able to choose values for the free γ-variables, such that the sequents
become valid. Note that the dependences of these choices are restricted by R. In a formal
top down representation, this reads:
Definition 5.17 ((C,R)-Validity) Let C be an R-choice-condition, let S be a Σ-struc-
ture, and let G be a set of sequents. G is (C,R)-valid in S if G is (π, e,S)-valid for some
(S, R)-valuation e and some π that is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R). G is (π, e,S)-valid
if G is
(
ǫ(π)(τ) ⊎ τ, e, S
)
-valid for each τ : Vδ → S.
Notice that the notion of (π, e,S)-validity with π : Vδ+ → (Vδ ❀ S)❀ S differs from
(δ, e,S)-validity with δ : V❀ S as given in Definition 5.4. Notice that (C,R)-validity
treats the free δ+-variables properly, whereas R-validity of Definition 5.4 does not.
In our framework the formula (E2) of § 3.1.1 looks like (E2′) in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.18 ((C,R)-Validity of (E2′)) Let C be an R-choice-condition.
For i ∈ {0, 1}, let Ai be a formula and xδ
+
i ∈ Vδ+ with C(x
δ+
i ) = Ai{x7→x
δ+
i },
xδ
+
i 6∈ V(A0, A1), x
δ+
i 6∈ dom(R), x
δ+
i 6∈ V(〈V\{x
δ+
i }〉C). The formula
∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ x
δ+
0 = x
δ+
1 (E2
′)
is (C,R)-valid.
Note that the conditions of Lemma5.18 may simply be achieved by taking fresh free δ+-vari-
ables xδ+0 and x
δ+
1 and adding (Vfree(Ai{x7→x
δ+
i })\{x
δ+
i })× {x
δ+
i } to the current variable-con-
dition. Very roughly speaking, Lemma5.18 holds because after choosing a value for xδ+0 we
can take the same value for xδ+1 , simply because x
δ+
1 is new and can read all free δ
−-variables,
and especially those that xδ+0 reads. We will actually do two proofs of Lemma5.18. First,
as an exercise for the reader, a semantical one right now, which is complicated and ugly.
And then in Example 5.23 a formal, nice, and short one in our calculus.
Proof of Lemma 5.18 Formally, in this proof we would have to apply the Explicitness
and the Substitution [Value] Lemma from § 5.3 several times, but we just argue informally
in a straightforward and intuitively clear manner. Otherwise the proof would be even longer
and more ugly.
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Let B := (∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ xδ
+
0 =x
δ+
1 ). Let S be an arbitrary Σ-structure. As
universes are non-empty, there is some (S, R)-valuation e with Se = ∅.
By Lemma5.12 there is some π that is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R). Define π′ by
π′(xδ
+
1 )(τ) :=
{
ǫ(π)(τ)(xδ
+
0 ) if ∀x. (A0⇔A1) is (ǫ(π)(τ) ⊎ τ, e,S)-valid.
ǫ(π)(τ)(xδ
+
1 ) otherwise
}
for τ : Vδ → S,
and π′(yδ+) := π(yδ+) for all yδ+ ∈ Vδ+\{xδ
+
1 }. By x
δ+
1 6∈ V(A0, A1), we have ǫ(π
′)(τ)(xδ
+
0 ) =
ǫ(π′)(τ)(xδ
+
1 ) for all τ : Vδ → S for which ∀x. (A0⇔A1) is (ǫ(π
′)(τ)⊎ τ, e,S)-valid. Thus,
B is (ǫ(π′)(τ) ⊎ τ, e,S)-valid. It remains to show that π′ is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R),
too. As π′ is obviously semantical, for Item1 of Definition 5.11 it suffices to show that
R ∪ Se ∪ Spi′ is well-founded. By xδ
+
1 6∈ dom(R), due to Se = ∅ and dom(Spi′) ⊆ Vδ , we
have xδ+1 6∈ dom(R ∪ Se ∪ Spi′). Therefore, it suffices to show that R ∪ Se ∪ Spi′↾V\{xδ+
1
} is
well-founded. But this is well-founded as a subrelation of R∪Se∪Spi, which is well-founded
because π is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R). It remains to show that Item2 of Definition 5.11
holds. By xδ+1 6∈ V(〈V\{x
δ+
1 }〉C), as π is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R), it suffices to show
Item2 only for xδ+1 . Let τ : Vδ → S and η : {x
δ+
1 } → S be arbitrary. Set δ0 := ǫ(π)(τ) ⊎ τ ,
δ1 := ǫ(π
′)(τ) ⊎ τ , δ′i := η⊎V\{xδ+
1
}↿δi, and δ
′′ := {xδ+0 7→ η(x
δ+
1 )}⊎V\{xδ+
0
}↿δ0. Suppose that
A1{x7→x
δ+
1 } is (δ
′
1, e,S)-valid. We have to show the claim that A1{x7→x
δ+
1 } is (δ1, e,S)-valid.
As δ′0 = δ
′
1, A1{x7→x
δ+
1 } is (δ
′
0, e,S)-valid. As π is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R), we have
that A1{x7→xδ
+
1 } is (δ0, e,S)-valid. If ∀x. (A0⇔A1) is not (δ0, e,S)-valid, then δ0 = δ1, and
the claim holds. Otherwise, as xδ+1 6∈ V(A0, A1) and V\{xδ+
1
}↿δ
′
1 = V\{xδ+
1
}↿δ0 = V\{xδ+
1
}↿δ1, we
know that A0{x7→xδ
+
1 } is (δ
′
1, e,S)-valid and it suffices to show that A0{x7→x
δ+
1 } is (δ1, e,S)-
valid. By xδ+i 6∈ V(A0, A1), A0{x7→x
δ+
0 } is (δ
′′, e,S)-valid and it suffices to show (note that
ǫ(π′)(τ)(xδ
+
1 ) = ǫ(π)(τ)(x
δ+
0 )) that A0{x7→x
δ+
0 } is (δ0, e,S)-valid, but this is the case indeed,
because π is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R). Q.e.d. (Lemma 5.18)
As already noted in § 4.6, the single-formula sequent QC(yδ
+
) of Definition 4.6 is a formula-
tion of axiom (ε0) of § 2.1.3 in our framework.
Lemma 5.19 ((C,R)-Validity of QC(y
δ+)) Let C be an R-choice-condition.
Let yδ+ ∈ dom(C). The formula QC(yδ
+
) is (C,R)-valid.
Moreover, QC(yδ
+
) is (π, e,S)-valid for any Σ-structure S, any (S, R)-valuation e, and
any π that is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R).
Proof of Lemma 5.19 Let C(yδ+) = λv0. . . . λvl−1. B for a formula B. Then we have
QC(y
δ+) = ∀v0. . . .∀vl−1.
(
∃y. (B{yδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) 7→ y}) ⇒ B
)
for an arbitrary
y ∈ Vbound\V(C(y
δ+)). For π being (e,S)-compatible with (C,R), the (π, e,S)-validity
follows now directly from Item2 of Definition 5.11, according to the short discussion fol-
lowing Definition 4.6. The rest is trivial. Q.e.d. (Lemma 5.19)
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5.7 Reduction
Reduction is the reverse of consequence. It is the backbone of logical reasoning, especially
of abduction and goal-directed deduction. Our version of reduction does not only reduce
a set of problems to another set of problems but also guarantees that the solutions of the
latter also solve the former; where “solutions” means the valuations for the rigid variables,
i.e. for the free γ-variables and the free δ+-variables.
Definition 5.20 (Reduction)
Let C be an R-choice-condition.
Let S be a Σ-structure, and let G0 and G1 be sets of sequents.
G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S if
for any (S, R)-valuation e and any π that is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R):
if G1 is (π, e,S)-valid, then G0 is (π, e,S)-valid.
Theorem 5.21 (Reduction)
Let C be an R-choice-condition; S a Σ-structure; G0, G1, G2, and G3 sets of sequents.
1. (Validity) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S and G1 is (C,R)-valid in S,
then G0 is (C,R)-valid in S, too.
2. (Reflexivity) In case of G0⊆G1: G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S.
3. (Transitivity) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S and G1 (C,R)-reduces to G2 in S,
then G0 (C,R)-reduces to G2 in S.
4. (Additivity) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G2 in S and G1 (C,R)-reduces to G3 in S,
then G0∪G1 (C,R)-reduces to G2∪G3 in S.
5. (Monotonicity) For (C ′, R′) being an extension of (C,R):
(a) If G0 is (C ′, R′)-valid in S, then G0 is (C,R)-valid in S.
(b) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S, then G0 (C ′, R′)-reduces to G1 in S.
6. (Instantiation) For an R-substitution σ on Vγδ+, the extended σ-update (C ′, R′)
of (C,R), and for O := dom(C) ∩ dom(σ) ∩ R∗〈Vδ+(G0, G1)〉:
(a) If G0σ ∪ (〈O〉QC)σ is (C ′, R′)-valid in S, then G0 is (C,R)-valid in S.
(b) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S, then G0σ (C ′, R′)-reduces to G1σ ∪ (〈O〉QC)σ in S.
Proof of Theorem5.21
Items 1 to 5 are the Items 1 to 5 of Lemma2.31 of [Wirth, 2004].
Item6 follows from LemmaB.6 of [Wirth, 2004] when we set the meta variable N of Lem-
maB.6 to dom(C) ∩ 〈(dom(C) ∩ dom(σ)) \O〉R∗. Q.e.d. (Theorem5.21)
Items 1 to 5 of Theorem5.21 are straightforward. Item6 is only technically complicated.
Roughly speaking, the idea behind Item6 is that reduction stays invariant under global
application of the substitution σ on rigid variables, provided that we change from (C,R)
to its extended σ-update (C ′, R′) and that, in case that σ replaces some free δ+-variable yδ+
constrained by the choice-condition C, we can establish that this is a proper choice by
showing (QC(yδ
+
))σ, cf. Definition 4.6. The rest of this § 5.7 will give further explanation
on the application of Theorem5.21 and especially of Item6.
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Example 5.22 (Instantiation with dom(C) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅)
For a simple application of Theorem5.21(6b), where no free δ+-variables occur and only a
free γ-variable is instantiated, let us have a glimpse at the example proof of [Wirth, 2004,
§ 3.3]. Let G0 be the proposition we want to prove, namely { z
γ
0(x
δ
0 )(y
δ
0 ) ≺ ack(x
δ
0 , y
δ
0 ) },
which says that Ackermann’s function has a lower bound that is to be determined during the
proof. Moreover, let G1—together with variable-condition R and R-choice-condition ∅—
represent the current state of the proof. Then G0 (∅, R)-reduces to G1. Moreover,
in the example, G1 reduces to a known lemma when we apply the substitution σ :=
{zγ0 7→ λx. λy. y}. Now, Theorem5.21(6b) says that the instantiated (and λβ-reduced)
theorem { yδ0 ≺ ack(x
δ
0 , y
δ
0 ) } (∅, R)-reduces to the instantiated proof state G1σ and
thus is (∅, R)-valid by Theorem5.21(3,1). Note that in this case the extended σ-update
of (∅, R) is (∅, R) itself, and we have O= ∅ due to dom(C) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅. Moreover, by
Theorem5.21(6a), also the original { zγ0(x
δ
0 )(y
δ
0 ) ≺ ack(x
δ
0 , y
δ
0 ) } is known to be (∅, R)-
valid, but who would be interested in this weaker result now?
Example 5.23 ((C,R)-Validity of (E2′)) (continuing Lemma 5.18)
Instead of the ugly semantical proof of (E2′) of Lemma5.18 in § 5.6, let us give a formal
proof of (E2′) in our framework on a very abstract level by applying Theorem5.21. We
will reduce the set containing the single-formula sequent of the formula (E2′) to a valid
set. This will complete our proof by Item1 of Theorem5.21. In the following, be aware of
the requirements on occurrence of the variables as described in Lemma5.18. We extend
(C,R) with a fresh variable yδ+ with C ′(yδ+) :=
(
(∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ y
δ+ =xδ
+
0 )
∧ (¬∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ A1{x 7→ y
δ+})
)
.
Of course, to satisfy Definition 5.9(1), the current variable-condition R must be extended to
R′ := R ∪ (Vfree(A0, A1) ∪ {x
δ+
0 })×{y
δ+}. Note that, if we had done this extension during
the proof, we would have needed Item5b to keep reduction invariant, but as there is no
reduction sequence given yet, it suffices to use Item5a instead. Similarly, instead of Item6b,
we apply Item6a, with σ := {xδ+1 7→ y
δ+}. Then we have O ⊆ dom(C) ∩ dom(σ) = {xδ+1 }.
For (C ′′, R′′) being the extended σ-update of (C ′, R′), Item6a says that it suffices to show
(C ′′, R′′)-validity of the set with the two single-formula sequents ∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ xδ
+
0 = y
δ+
and (QC′(xδ
+
1 ))σ. The latter sequent reads (∃x. A1{x 7→ x
δ+
1 }{x
δ+
1 7→ x} ⇒ A1{x 7→ x
δ+
1 })σ,
i.e. ∃x. A1 ⇒ A1{x 7→ yδ
+}. But a simple case analysis on ∀x. (A0⇔A1) shows that the
whole set (C ′′, R′′)-reduces to

∃x. A0 ⇒ A0{x 7→ x
δ+
0 };


∃y.
(
(∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ y= x
δ+
0 )
∧ (¬∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ A1{x 7→ y})
)
⇒
(
(∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ y
δ+ =xδ
+
0 )
∧ (¬∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ A1{x 7→ y
δ+})
)




,
i.e. to {QC′′(xδ
+
0 ); QC′′(y
δ+)}, which is (C ′′, R′′)-valid by Lemma5.19. (Note that by
Item4 of Theorem5.21 it would have been sufficient to show that each of the the formulas
of the set (C ′′, R′′)-reduces to some (C ′′, R′′)-valid set.) Thus, (E2′)σ is (C ′′, R′′)-valid.
By Item6a this means that (E2′) is (C ′, R′)-valid, and by Item5a this means that (E2′) is
(C,R)-valid, as was to be shown. Note that we have R′′ := R′ ∪ {(yδ+, xδ+1 )}, so that σ is
an R′-substitution. Indeed, the graph of R′′ is acyclic:
xδ
+
0 R′
// yδ
+
R′′
// xδ
+
1
Vfree(A0)
R+
OO
R′
55❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥❥
Vfree(A1)
R+
OO
R′
ii❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚
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(continuing Example 4.7)
Example 5.24 (Instantiation with Higher-Order Choice-Condition)
Suppose that
(p1) ∀v.
(
∃y. (v= y+1) ⇒ (v= p(v)+1)
)
is one of our lemmas for the predecessor function p in the arithmetic of natural numbers,
and that we want to use this lemma as justification for replacing yδ+(p1) under R-choice-
condition C(yδ+(p1)) = λv. (v= y
δ+
(p1)(v)+1) globally with p. Note that this was required
in Example 4.7. By Theorem5.21(6), for σ := {yδ+(p1) 7→p}, we have to show (QC(y
δ+
(p1)))σ,
which does not seem to be any problem because (QC(yδ
+
(p1)))σ is just the above lemma (p1).
5.8 On the Design of Similar Operators
In § 1 we already mentioned that the semantic free-variable framework for our εmay serve as
the paradigm for the design of other operators similar to our version of the ε. In this § 5.8,
we give some general hints on the two screws which may be turned to achieve the intended
properties of such new operators.
The one screw to turn is the definition of (C,R)-validity. For instance, the “some π”
in Definition 5.17 is something we can play around with. Indeed, in [Wirth, 1998, Defi-
nition 5.7 (Definition 4.4 in short version)], we can read “any π” instead, which is just the
opposite extreme; for which (E2′) of Lemma5.18 is valid iff ∃!x.A0 ∨ ∃x.∀y.(x=y).
In between of both extremes, we could design operators tailored for generalized quantifiers
(e.g. with cardinality specifications) or for the special needs of specification and computa-
tion of semantics of discourses in natural language. Note that the changes of our general
framework for these operators would be quite moderate: In any case, it is “any π” what
we read in the important Lemma5.19 and the crucial Definition 5.20. Roughly speaking,
only Theorem5.21(6a) for the case of O 6= ∅ as well as Theorem5.21(5a) would become
false for a different choice on the quantification of π in Definition 5.17. The reason why
we prefer “some π” to “any π” here and in [Wirth, 2004] is that “some π” results in more
valid formulas (e.g. (E2′)) and makes theorem proving easier. Contrary to “any π” and to
all semantics in the literature, “some π” frees us from considering all possible choices: We
just have to pick a single arbitrary one and fix it in a proof step. Moreover, “some π” is
very close to Hilbert’s intentions on ε-substitution as described best in [Hilbert & Bernays,
1968/70, Vol. II, § 2.4].
The other screw to turn is the definition of compatibility. For instance, by modify-
ing Item2 of Definition 5.11 we can strengthen the notion of compatibility in such a way
that δ(yδ+) has to pick the smallest value such that B becomes (δ, e,S)-valid. With that
modification of compatibility it would be interesting to model the failed trials of Hilbert’s
group to show termination of ε-substitution in arithmetic before [Ackermann, 1940] as
described in [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70, Vol. II, § 2.4].
All in all, in our conceptually disentangled framework for the ε, there are at least these
two well-defined and conceptually simple screws to turn for a convenient adjustment to
achieve similar operators for different purposes.
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6 Examples and Discussion on Philosophy of Language
6.1 Motivation and Overview
In this § 6, we exemplify our version of Hilbert’s ε with several linguistic standard examples.
The reason for choosing philosophy of language and the semantics of sentences in natural
language as the field for our examples is threefold:
(ℵ) These examples are simple and easily comprehensible, even without linguistic exper-
tise. Moreover, they provide interesting and relevant test cases for descriptive terms
and their logical frameworks.
(i) The choice of our examples is natural due to the close relation of our ε to semantics for
indefinite (and definite) articles and anaphoric pronouns in some natural languages.
(We ignore, however, the generic, qualitative, metaphoric, and pragmatic effects of
these indefinite determiners; cf. § 6.2.3.)
(k) We hope that linguists find our solutions to these standard examples interesting
enough to evaluate our semantics on its usefulness for developing tools that may
help to represent and compute the semantics of sentences and discourses in natural
language.
(Although the careful reader will find some method in our preference for certain
representations, it would go far beyond the scope of this paper to present concrete
procedures for generating different representational variants and to decide on which
of them to prefer.)
We will proceed as follows: In § 6.2 we introduce to the description of the semantics of
determiners in natural languages, and show that the ε is useful for it. In § 6.3 we have
a brief look at the linguistic literature on Hilbert’s ε. In § 6.4 we discuss cases that are
difficult to model with our ε, such as Henkin quantifiers and cyclic choice in Bach–Peters
sentences. We look at problems with right-unique ε in § 6.5, at donkey sentences in § 6.6,
and at the difficulty of capturing semantics of natural language with quantifiers in § 6.7.
To speed our hope expressed in (k) above, we try to make this § 6 accessible without
reading the formally involved previous § 5. Accordingly, we remind or inform the reader
of the following: We apply Smullyan’s classification (cf. [Smullyan, 1968]) of problem-
reduction rules into α, β, γ, and δ, and call the quantifiers eliminated and the variables intro-
duced by γ- and δ-steps, γ- and δ-quantifiers and free γ- and free δ-variables, respectively.
Free γ-variables (written xγ) are implicitly existentially quantified. Free δ−-variables (xδ )
are implicitly universally quantified. The structure of the quantification is represented in a
variable-condition. A variable-condition is a directed acyclic graph on free variables. The
value of a free variable may transitively depend on the predecessors in the variable-condition,
with the exception of the free δ−-variables that may always take arbitrary values. Moreover,
a free δ+-variable such as xδ+ is existentially quantified but must take a value that makes
its choice-condition C(xδ+) true—if such a choice is possible. In problem reduction, free
δ−-variables behave as constant parameters, free γ-variables may be globally instantiated
with any term that does not violate the current variable-condition, and the instantiation
of free δ+-variables must additionally satisfy the current choice-condition. Furthermore, a
sequent is a list of formulas which denotes the disjunction of these formulas.
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6.2 Introduction: Pro and Contra Reference
In this § 6.2, we introduce to the description of the semantics of determiners in natural
languages, and show that the ε is useful for it. We take the historical path by shedding
some light on the following two seminal philosophic papers, which capture most opposite
views pro and contra reference in natural languages:
Pro: [Meinong, 1904a]: “Ueber GegenĆandŊtheorie” by Alexius Meinong (1853–1920)
Contra: [Russell, 1905a]: “On Denoting” by Bertrand Russell (1872–1970)
As our ε does not surrender to the present king of France, it could help Russell to return
to his original appreciation of Meinong’s ideas and position, which he still expressed in
[Russell, 1905b].
6.2.1 I met a man. (R1)
In [Russell, 1905a], the affirmation (R1) is taken to be
‘I met x and x is human’ is not always false. (R2)
(Russell’s identification of being a man and being human is not relevant to us here.)
From [Russell, 1919, ChapterXV], it becomes clear that (R2) means what today would
be stated as
∃x.
(
Met(I, x) ∧ Human(x)
)
(W1)
In our free-variable framework, we can omit the γ-quantifier of (W1) and replace its bound
γ-variable x either with a free γ-variable xγ1 or with a free δ
+-variable xδ+0 constrained with a
tautological choice-condition. This results in one of the logically equivalent forms of either
Met(I, xγ1) ∧ Human(x
γ
1) (W2)
or
Met(I, xδ
+
0 ) ∧ Human(x
δ+
0 ) (W3)
with choice-condition
C(xδ
+
0 ) := true (W4)
Note that (W3)+(W4) is logically equivalent to each of (W1) and (W2) because we have
chosen an implicit existential quantification for our free δ+-variables. This could be changed
to universal or generalized quantification for the design of operators for descriptive terms
similar to our novel ε-operator. Our preferred reading of (R1), however, is the following:
Met(I, xδ
+
0 ) (W5)
with choice-condition
C(xδ
+
0 ) := Met(I, x
δ+
0 ) ∧ Human(x
δ+
0 ) (W6)
Only if there is an emphasis on the conviction that it was a human indeed whom I met, i.e.
that the choice-condition (W6) denotes, we would model (R1) as (W3)+(W6).
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The logical equivalence of (W3)+(W6) with (W1) is nothing but a version of Hilbert’s
original axiom (ε1) for elimination the existential quantifier in our free-variable framework,
where xδ+0 replaces the ε-term εx.
(
Met(I, x) ∧ Human(x)
)
.
(W5)+(W6), however, is a proper logical consequence of (W1) in general: If (W1) is
false, (W5)+(W6) still would be true if I were Redcap and met the wolf disguised as a
human. A listener knowing for certain that there are no men in the forest may make sense
out of what Redcap tells him by assuming that the man she met denotes a specific object,
and then find out that it must be the wolf. Then (W5)+(W6) is true; to wit, pick the
wolf for xδ+0 . This is so because we may choose any object if the choice-condition does not
denote, i.e. if it is unsatisfiable in the context under consideration.
6.2.2 Scott is the author of Waverley. (SW1)
(SW1) is another famous example from [Russell, 1919, ChapterXVI]. We model it as
Scott = zδ+ (SW2)
with choice-condition
C(zδ
+
) := “zδ+ is author of Waverley” (SW3)
For the choice-condition C of (SW3), our version QC(zδ
+
) of Hilbert’s original axiom (ε0)
reads
∃z. “z is author of Waverley” ⇒ “zδ+ is author of Waverley”
For global application of the substitution σ := {zδ+ 7→ Scott}, we have to show (QC(zδ
+
))σ.
This is valid, provided that Scott is author of Waverley. Thus, by Theorem5.21(6a), we
can infer the validity of (SW2)+(SW3) from the validity of the σ-instance of (SW2), which
is the tautology “Scott = Scott”. This is in blank opposition to the following statement
([Russell, 1905a]):
“The proposition ‘Scott was the author of Waverley’ ” . . . “does not contain any
constituent ‘the author of Waverley’ for which we could substitute ‘Scott’.”
One could try to defend Russell’s statement by arguing that he may only have seen his
reduced syntactical form
∃z.
(
∀y.
(
(y=z) ⇔ “y is the author of Waverley”
)
∧ Scott = z
)
, (SW4)
but—after a deeper contemplation on (SW4) and the concept of reference in general, and
after a closer look at [Russell, 1905a] and [Russell, 1919]—Russell’s statement seems to be
just an outcome of Russell’s strange philosophy of sometimes ignoring Kant’s distinction on
a posteriori and a priori , Frege’s notion of sense, and, in general, the functions of syntax
and logical calculi, mixing them up with semantics. That Russell did so becomes more
obvious from the following simpler statement [Russell, 1919, p.175]:
“ ‘Scott is Sir Walter’ is the same trivial proposition as ‘Scott is Scott’.”
Beyond that, [Russell, 1905a] argues contra reference in general, but in favor of encoding
reference into mere predicate logic as in (SW4). Advantages of (SW2)+(SW3) over (SW4),
however, are its elegance and simplicity as well as the introduction of the formal reference
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object zδ+, which is non-trivially constrained by (SW3) and may be reused for further
reference.
6.2.3 Ignoring the Definite, Generic, Qualitative, Salient, Specific, &c.
As a most interesting standard example we will consider “a/the round quadrangle is quad-
rangular” in § 6.2.4. We do not want to emphasize “the round quadrangle” as we want to
circumvent the extra complication introduced by the definite syntactical form, which may
or may not indicate properties such as uniqueness, specifity, or salience. We also do not
want to emphasize “a round quadrangle is quadrangular” as we are not interested in the
generic reading
∀x.
(
Round(x) ∧ Quadrangular(x) ⇒ Quadrangular(x)
)
.
To be precise, we have to specify that we are interested in reference (i.e. not in predication)
and that the usage of indefinite determiners (articles and pronouns) we intend to mirror with
the ε here is particular (i.e. not generic) and referential (i.e. not qualitative). Generic and
qualitative usage of indefinite articles is merely quantificational and refers to a property
(predication) and not to an object having it (reference). For example, in the sentence
“An elephant is a huge animal.” the “An” is generic and the “a” is qualitative. It simply
says ∀x.
(
Elephant(x) ⇒ Huge(x) ∧ Animal(x)
)
. Moreover, our modeling with the ε
does not presuppose that the description designates or that it is salient or specific. Note
that the distinctions on salience and specifity depend on a discourse and the referential
status for the speaker, resp., which we do not take into account here.
6.2.4 The round quadrangle is quadrangular.
With the proviso of § 6.2.3, we now model “a/the round quadrangle is quadrangular” as
Quadrangular(yδ
+
1 ) (S)
with choice-condition
C(yδ
+
1 ) := Round(y
δ+
1 ) ∧ Quadrangular(y
δ+
1 ) (C1)
The choice-condition C(yδ+1 ) of (C1) is equivalent to false if we have the sequent
¬Round(uδ ), ¬Quadrangular(uδ ) (A)
available as a lemma. Then, we may choose any object for yδ+1 . If we chose a quadrangular
one, (S) becomes true. Thus, the statement (S)+(C1) is valid, due to our choice of an
implicit existential quantification for the free δ+-variables. We cannot follow the critique
of [Russell, 1905a] against [Meinong, 1904a] here, namely that yδ+ would be “apt to infringe
the Law of Contradiction”. Firstly, yδ+ is well-specified by (C1) and denoting a well-defined
object. Secondly, we do not even follow [Russell, 1905a] insofar as undefined objects in a
domain would be in conflict with the Law of Contradiction. Indeed, for very good practical
reasons, we find
(H) linguistically motivated models with arbitrary not really existing objects in [Hobbs,
1996] and [Hobbs, 2003ff., § 2.2], (as part of the ontological promiscuity suggested for
the logical notation, cf. [Hobbs, 2003ff., § 1, Note 14]), and
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(W) logically motivated models with arbitrary undefined objects in [Kühler &Wirth, 1996],
and [Wirth, 2009].
The “really existing” or “defined” objects are simply those for which a predicate “Rexists”
or “Def ” holds. This treatment obeys both the Law of Contradiction and the Law of the
Excluded Middle. While in the approach of (H) we have to replace (A) with
¬Round(uδ ), ¬Quadrangular(uδ ), ¬Rexists(uδ )
there is an additional possibility in the approach of (W) where the standard variables range
over defined objects only: When the variable yδ+1 in (C1) is a general variable, ranging
over the defined as well as the undefined objects, and the variable uδ in (A) is a standard
variable, ranging over the defined objects only, then there are models of (A) with undefined
objects that are both round and quadrangular. Note that this syntactical trick of (W)
is not just syntactical sugar improving the readability of formulas critically, but also cuts
down logical inference by restricting notions such as matching, unification, and rewriting.
6.2.5 The round quadrangle is just as certainly round as it is quadrangular.
Russell’s critique on [Meinong, 1904a] is justified, however, insofar as a single statement of
[Meinong, 1904a] seems to be in conflict with the Law of Contradiction, indeed: Assum-
ing (A) from above, there seems to be no way to model the 2nd line of the following sentence
as true in two-valued logics [Meinong, 1904a, p. 8, modernized orthography]:
\NiĚt nur der vielberufene goldene Berg iĆ von Gold, sondern auĚ
daŊ runde ViereĘ iĆ so gewisŊ rund alŊ eŊ viereĘig iĆ." (V)
“Not only the notorious golden mountain is of gold, but also
the round quadrangle is just as certainly round as it is quadrangular.”
(our translation)
Of course, one could consider a trivial generic reading:
∀x.
(
Round(x) ∧ Quadrangular(x) ⇒ Round(x) ∧ Quadrangular(x)
)
.
But this is most unlikely to be intended due to the definite forms of the articles, especially
due to the one in the 1st line of (V). Our preferred reading of the 2nd line of (V) is
Round(yδ
+
1 ) ∧ Quadrangular(y
δ+
1 ), (P)
referring to the choice-condition of (C1) above. Now (P) simplifies to false under the
assumption of (A), unless either
• we restrict uδ in (A) to the defined, as sketched in § 6.2.4 (for which there is no
indication in [Meinong, 1904a], however), or else
• we choose some para-consistent logics, where a contradiction does not imply triviality,
cf. [Priest & Tanaka, 2009] (for which, however, there is no indication in [Meinong,
1904a], either). Contrary to its promising title “Meinong’s Theory of Objects and
Hilbert’s ε-symbol”, [Costa &al., 1991] does not contain relevant information (neither
on Meinong’s GegenĆandŊtheorie nor on Hilbert’s ε) besides sketching a para-consistent
logic.
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Alternatively, [Meinong, 1904a] may be consistently understood as follows:
Note that Meinong’s “GegenĆand” is best translated as “object” and his “GegenĆandŊtheorie” as
“Theory of Objects”. Possible other translations would be “subject”, “concept reference”, or
“referent with choice-condition”, but neither “thing” nor “objective”. According to [Meinong,
1904a, p. 40f.], GegenĆandŊtheorie is the most general aprioristic science, whereas metaphysics
is the most general aposterioristic science. Thus, GegenĆandŊtheorie is not less general than
metaphysics, and we should carefully exclude from Meinong’s notion of a GegenĆand any
connotation of being physical or realizable. There is no explicit definition of GegenĆand in
[Meinong, 1904a], but only a parenthetical indication:
. . . \die Bezugnahme, ja daŊ auŊdrđĘliĚe GeriĚtetsein auf jeneŊ
’
etwaŊ‘, oder wie man ja ganz
ungezwungen sagt, auf einen GegenĆand" . . . [Meinong, 1904a, p. 2]
. . . “the reference, indeed the explicit pointing to that ‘something’, or—as one
would very informally say—to a GegenĆand” . . . (our translation)
(“pointing to” may be replaced with “aiming at”)
Having clarified the notion of GegenĆand a little, let us come back to the 2nd line of (V).
On the one hand, as stated already above, our preferred reading (P) contradicts the above
sequent (A). On the other hand, the reading “Round(yδ+1 ) ⇔ Quadrangular(y
δ+
1 )” implies
“¬Round(yδ+1 ) ∧ ¬Quadrangular(y
δ+
1 )” by (A). This reading, however, is very unlikely to be
intended by somebody whose German is as excellent as Meinong’s. I assume that Meinong
wanted to say that a specification for reference—such as C(yδ+1 ) in (C1) above—is meaningful
and should denote, no matter whether there is an object that satisfies it. Indeed, we read:
. . . \waŊ dem GegenĆande in keiner Weise ĽuerliĚ iĆ, vielmehr sein eigentliĚeŊ Wesen auŊmaĚt, in
seinem Sosein beĆeht, daŊ dem GegenĆand anhaftet, mag er sein oder niĚt sein."
[Meinong, 1904a, p.13]
. . . “what is not contingent to a GegenĆand but establishes its proper character
constitutes its suchness, which sticks to the GegenĆand, may it be or not be.”
(our translation)
In this light, might the 2nd line of (V) even be boldly read as the valid statement
Round(yδ
+
1 ) ∧ Quadrangular(y
δ+
2 ), (P
′)
with (C1) and
C(yδ
+
2 ) := Round(y
δ+
2 ) ∧ Quadrangular(y
δ+
2 ) (C2)
6.2.6 Conclusion
All in all, we may conclude that the ε—and especially our novel treatment of it—is useful
for describing the semantics of determiners in natural languages: We can formalize some
of Meinong’s ideas on philosophy of language and contribute to the defense of his points of
view against Russell’s critique, even on empty descriptions.
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6.3 A brief look at the Linguistic Literature on the ε
In this § 6.3, we have a brief look at the linguistically motivated literature on Hilbert’s ε,
which goes beyond our discussion in §§ 2 and 3. The usefulness of Hilbert’s ε for the
description of the semantics of natural language is simultaneously threatened by right-
uniqueness and uncommitted choice, which seem to be opposite threats like Scylla and
Charybdis, hard to pass by in between even for brave Ulysses.
Right-Uniqueness: A right-unique behavior of the ε is a problem in natural language.
For example, the same phrase modeled as an ε-term does not necessarily denote the
same object. Indeed, it may necessarily denote two different ones as in “If a bishop
meets a bishop, . . . ”.
Based on Natural Deduction (cf. [Gentzen, 1935], [Prawitz, 1965]), Wilfried P. M. Meyer-
Viol presents in his PhD thesis [Meyer-Viol, 1995] most interesting results on the ε in
intuitionistic logic and a lot of fascinating ideas on how to use it for computing the semantics
of sentences in natural language. The latter ideas, however, suffer from a right-unique
behavior of the ε. We will discuss more problems with the right-uniqueness requirement
in § 6.5 along [Geurts, 2000].
Uncommitted Choice: A major advantage of reference in natural language is the pos-
sibility to refer to an object a second time. Thus, the ε can hardly be of any use in
semantics of natural language without the possibility to express committed choice;
cf. § 2.6. Note, however, that — to express committed choice — we need right-
uniqueness unless we replace the ε-terms with free δ+-variables; cf. §§ 2.6 and 3.1.6.
Already in 1993, Jan van Eijck addressed the double problem of Scylla and Charybdis in
the first part of the following sentence:
“What we want, instead, is to employ different choice functions as we go along,
and to let the interpretation process fail in case no appropriate choice of ϕ is
possible because there are no ϕs.” [Eijck, 1993, p. 242f.]
The second part of this sentence, however, is a judgment contra the ε, which we cannot
accept: If we want to model a natural language discourse, we have to introduce a reference
object even if currently no salient object satisfies the choice-condition of its free δ+-variable;
moreover, even for the round quadrangle we have to introduce an object because we cannot
talk about it otherwise.
Klaus von Heusinger seems to take the first part of Eijck’s sentence as a task instead
of a problem description: In Heusinger [1997], the right-uniqueness of the ε is kept, but
the usefulness for describing the semantics of natural language is improved by adding a
situational index to the ε-symbol that makes it possible to denote different choice functions
explicitly; cf. (19a′) in our § 6.6 for an example. We will refer to this indexed ε as
“Heusinger’s indexed ε-operator”. It already occurs in the English draft paper [Heusinger,
1996]. The book [Heusinger, 1997], however, is a German monograph on applying Hilbert’s
epsilon to the semantics of noun phrases and pronouns in natural language, with a focus
on salience. Heusinger’s indexed ε-operator is used to describe the definite as well as
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the indefinite article in specific as well as non-specific contexts, resulting in four different
representations.9 Cf. [Heusinger, 1997] for further reference on the ε in the semantics of
natural language.
The possible advantage of our semantics for the ε is that it is not right-unique but admits
commitment to choices. Thus, it may help brave Ulysses to avoid both threats.
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6.4 Problematic Aspects of Our ε
In this § 6.4, we discuss some aspects whose modeling in our free variable framework with
our ε may fail when we take the straightforward way. The reason for this partial failure
is that the posed representational demands are in conflict with our requirement of well-
foundedness or acyclicity on the variable-condition R of our R-choice-conditions, cf. §§ 4.2
and 5.2, Definition 5.9, and Example 5.10. These representational demands are Henkin
quantification (§ 6.4.1) and cyclic choice in Bach–Peters sentences (§ 6.4.2). We also show
how to overcome these two weaknesses in our framework by simple deviations, namely by
raising and by parallel choice.
6.4.1 Henkin Quantification
In [Hintikka, 1974], quantifiers in first-order logic were found insufficient to give the precise
semantics of some English sentences. In [Hintikka, 1996], IF logic, i.e. Independence-
Friendly logic—a first-order logic with more flexible quantifiers—is presented to overcome
this weakness. In [Hintikka, 1974], we find the following sentence:
Some relative of each villager and some relative of each townsman
hate each other. (H0)
Let us first change to a lovelier subject:
Some loved one of each woman and some loved one of each man
love each other. (H1)
For our purposes here, we consider (H1) to be equivalent to the following sentence, which
may be easier to understand and more meaningful:
Every woman would love someone and every man would love someone,
such that these loved ones would love each other.
(H1) can be represented by the following Henkin-quantified IF-logic formula:
∀x0. ∀y0.


(
Female(x0)
∧ Male(y0)
)
⇒ ∃y1/y0. ∃x1/x0.


Loves(x0, y1)
∧ Loves(y0, x1)
∧ Loves(y1, x1)
∧ Loves(x1, y1)



 (H2)
Note that Formula (H2) is already close to anti-prenex form; so we cannot reduce the
dependences of its quantifiers by moving them closer toward the leaves of the formula tree.
Let us refer to the standard game-theoretic semantics for quantifiers (cf. e.g. [Hintikka,
1996]), which is defined as follows: Witnesses have to be picked for the quantified variables
outside-in. We have to pick the witnesses for the γ-quantifiers (i.e., in (H2), for the existen-
tial quantifiers), and our opponent in the game picks the witnesses for the δ-quantifiers
(i.e. for the universal quantifiers in (H2)). We win iff the resulting quantifier-free formula
evaluates to true. A formula is true iff we have a winning strategy.
Then a Henkin quantifier such as “∃y1/y0.” in (H2) is a special quantifier, which is a
bit different from “∃y1.”. Game-theoretically, it has the following semantics: It asks us
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to pick the loved one y1 independently from the choice of the man y0 (by our opponent in
the game), although the Henkin quantifier occurs in the scope of the quantifier “∀y0.”.
An alternative way to define the semantics of Henkin quantifiers is by describing their
effect on the logically equivalent raised forms of the formulas in which they occur. Raising
is a dual of Skolemization, cf. [Miller, 1992]. The raised version is defined as usual, beside
that a γ-quantifier, say “∃y1.”, followed by a slash as in “∃y1/y0.”, are raised in such a
form that y0 does not appear as an argument to the raising function for y1.
According to this, mutatis mutandis, (H2) is logically equivalent to its following raised
form (H3), where y0 does not occur as an argument to the raising function y1(x0), which,
however, would be the case if we had a usual γ-quantifier “∃y1.” instead of “∃y1/y0.”
in (H2).
∃y1. ∃x1. ∀x0. ∀y0.


(
Female(x0)
∧ Male(y0)
)
⇒


Loves(x0, y1(x0))
∧ Loves(y0, x1(y0))
∧ Loves(y1(x0), x1(y0))
∧ Loves(x1(y0), y1(x0))



 (H3)
Now, (H3) looks already very much like the following tentative representation of (H1) in
our framework of free variables:(
Female(xδ0 )
∧ Male(yδ0 )
)
⇒


Loves(xδ0 , y
δ+
1 )
∧ Loves(yδ0 , x
δ+
1 )
∧ Loves(yδ+1 , x
δ+
1 )
∧ Loves(xδ+1 , y
δ+
1 )

 (H1′)
with choice-condition C given by C(yδ+1 ) := Female(x
δ
0 ) ⇒ Loves(x
δ
0 , y
δ+
1 )
C(xδ
+
1 ) := Male(y
δ
0 ) ⇒ Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ+
1 )
which requires the variable-condition to contain RC := {(xδ0 , y
δ+
1 ), (y
δ
0 , x
δ+
1 )} by Defini-
tion 5.9(1). Note that we can add (yδ+1 , y
δ
0 ) to our variable-condition R here to express
that yδ+1 must not read y
δ
0 , which results in a logical equivalence to the original formula (H2)
but with a standard γ-quantification “∃x1.” instead of the Henkin quantification “∃x1/x0.”.
If we tried to model the Henkin quantifier by adding (xδ+1 , x
δ
0 ) to R in addition, our
choice-condition C would not be an R-choice-condition anymore by Definition 5.9 due to
the following cycle:
yδ
+
1
R
))❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘ xδ0
RCoo
xδ
+
1
R
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yδ0
RCoo
As shown in Example 2.9 of [Wirth, 2004], the δ+-rules from § 4.2 become unsound when
we admit such cycles. Without the δ+-rules we could argue that RC means something like
“is read by” and that R means something like “must not read”, so that it would be sufficient
to require only the given irreflexivity of RC◦R, instead of the irreflexivity of the transitive
closure of RC∪R, which is nothing but the acyclicity of RC∪R. Such “weak forms” are
indeed sound for δ−-rules (cf. [Wirth, 2004, Note 9]), but the price of abandoning the
δ+-rules (esp. in a framework for Hilbert’s ε) is ridiculously high in comparison to an
increased order of some variables, such as of x1 and y1 in (H3).
Let us compare the failure of our approach to represent Henkin quantifiers without
raising on the one hand, with the situation in [Heusinger, 1996, p. 85] (where (H0) has
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the label (25)) on the other hand. It may be interesting to see that it is well possible
to model Henkin quantifiers with a right-unique version of Hilbert’s ε, cf. [Heusinger,
1996], p. 85, (25c). After replacing both “hating” and “being a relative” with “loving”,
adding the fact that the loved ones are not chosen from empty sets of candidates (i.e.
the presupposition that they exist), using free δ−-variables for the outermost universal
bound variables, correcting a flaw,10 and enhancing readability by introducing two more
free δ−-variables xδ1 and y
δ
1 , (25c) of [Heusinger, 1996] reads:

Female(xδ0 )
∧ Male(yδ0 )
∧ xδ1 = εx1. Loves(y
δ
0 , x1)
∧ yδ1 = εy1. Loves(x
δ
0 , y1)

 ⇒


Loves(xδ0 , y
δ
1 )
∧ Loves(yδ0 , x
δ
1 )
∧ Loves(yδ1 , x
δ
1 )
∧ Loves(xδ1 , y
δ
1 )

 (H5)
To model the Henkin quantifier correctly, an ε-term such as “εx1. Loves(yδ0 , x1)” in (H5)
must not depend on xδ0 . This is contrary to x
δ+
1 in (H1
′), whose value may well depend
on that of xδ0 , unless (x
δ+
1 , x
δ
0 ) is included in R
+. To achieve this independence, it is
not necessary that the ε gets an extensional semantics. It suffices that the semantics of
the ε-term does not depend on anything not named in its formula, namely “Loves(yδ0 , x1)”
in our case. On the one hand, any of the semantics of § 3.1 satisfies this independence,
but—due to its right-uniqueness—is not suitable for describing the semantics of determiners
in natural languages, cf. § 6.3, Item “Right-Uniqueness”. On the other hand, Heusinger’s
indexed ε-operator, however, does not necessarily satisfy this independence, because it
may get information on xδ0 out of its situational index, cf. § 6.3, below Item “Uncommitted
Choice”, and § 6.5.
Thus, the inability of our framework to capture Henkin quantifiers without raising is
also implicitly present in all other known approaches suitable for describing the semantics
of determiners in natural languages.
Moreover, raising cannot be avoided in the presence of explicit ε-terms because these
terms are an equivalent to raising already.
Furthermore, in natural language, Henkin quantification is typically ambiguous and
the Henkin-quantified versions are always logically stronger than the ones with usual
γ-quantifiers instead. Thus, it appears to be advantageous to have more flexibility in
computing the semantics of sentences in natural language by starting with possibly weaker
formulations such as (H1′). While we cannot represent the Henkin quantification in our
framework without raising, we could start with the following raised version of (H1′).

Female(xδ0 )
∧ Male(yδ0 )
∧ xδ1 = x
δ+
3 (x
δ
0 )(y
δ
0 )
∧ yδ1 = y
δ+
2 (x
δ
0 )

 ⇒


Loves(xδ0 , y
δ
1 )
∧ Loves(yδ0 , x
δ
1 )
∧ Loves(yδ1 , x
δ
1 )
∧ Loves(xδ1 , y
δ
1 )

 (H2′)
with R-choice-condition C given by
C(yδ
+
2 ) := λx. (Female(x) ⇒ Loves(x, y
δ+
2 (x)))
C(xδ
+
2 ) := λy. (Male(y) ⇒ Loves(y, x
δ+
2 (y)))
C(xδ
+
3 ) := λx. λy. (Female(x) ∧ Male(y) ⇒ Loves(y, x
δ+
3 (x)(y)))
which requires no extension of the variable-condition R. When we then find out that
the sentence is actually meant to be Henkin quantified, we can apply the substitu-
tion σ := {xδ+3 7→ λu. x
δ+
2 }. This turns (H2
′) into a form equivalent to (H3), reflecting
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the intended semantics of (H1). Note that the condition (QC(xδ
+
3 ))σ (cf. Definition 4.6),
which is required for invariance of reduction under instantiation in Theorem5.21(6), is
∀x. ∀y.
(
∃z. (Female(x) ∧ Male(y) ⇒ Loves(y, z))
⇒ (Female(x) ∧ Male(y) ⇒ Loves(y, (λu. xδ+2 )(x)(y)))
)
and simplifies to
∀y.
(
∃z. (Male(y) ⇒ Loves(y, z))
⇒ (Male(y) ⇒ Loves(y, xδ+2 (y)))
)
,
which is just QC(xδ
+
2 ), which is valid according to Lemma5.19.
A solution without raising will be found in [Wirth, 2012a].
6.4.2 Cyclic Choices and Bach–Peters Sentences
As an example where references of an anaphor and a cataphor cross (i.e. a so-called “Bach–
Peters sentence” after Emmon Bach and Stanley Peters), consider
A man who loves her marries a woman who, however, does not love him. (B0)
If we start with
Marries(yδ
+
0 , x
δ+
0 ) (B1)
with R-choice-condition C(yδ+0 ) := Male(y
δ+
0 ) ∧ Loves(y
δ+
0 , f
γ
1(y
δ+
0 )) ∧ Female(f
γ
1(y
δ+
0 )),
C(xδ
+
0 ) := Female(x
δ+
0 ) ∧ ¬Loves(x
δ+
0 , f
γ
2(x
δ+
0 )) ∧ Male(f
γ
2(x
δ+
0 )),
then R+ has to contain {(f γ1 , y
δ+
0 ), (f
γ
2 , x
δ+
0 )} according to Definition 5.9(1). This says
that the substitution σ := {f γ1 7→ λz. x
δ+
0 , f
γ
2 7→ λz. y
δ+
0 }, which binds the pronouns
“her” (f γ1(y
δ+
0 )) and “him” (f
γ
2(x
δ+
0 )) to their intended referents x
δ+
0 and y
δ+
0 , resp., is not an
R-substitution, however. This is due to the following cycle; cf. Definition 5.3:
yδ
+
0
Rσ
((❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘❘
❘ f
γ
1
Roo
xδ
+
0
Rσ
66❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧
f γ2
Roo
Indeed, the (extended) σ-updated (and λβ-reduced) choice-condition (C ′, R′) of (C,R)
(cf. Definition 5.15), namely C ′(yδ+0 ) := Male(y
δ+
0 ) ∧ Loves(y
δ+
0 , x
δ+
0 ) ∧ Female(x
δ+
0 ),
C ′(xδ
+
0 ) := Female(x
δ+
0 ) ∧ ¬Loves(x
δ+
0 , y
δ+
0 ) ∧ Male(x
δ+
0 ),
cannot be an R′-choice-condition for any (acyclic) variable-condition R′, cf. Definition 5.9.
As we cannot choose yδ+0 before x
δ+
0 nor x
δ+
0 before y
δ+
0 , we have to choose them in parallel.
Thus, the only way to overcome this failure within our framework seems to be to start with
Marries(1st(zδ
+
), 2nd(zδ
+
)) (B2)
with choice-condition
C1(z
δ+) :=
(
Male(1st(zδ
+
)) ∧ Loves(1st(zδ+), f γ1(z
δ+)) ∧ Female(f γ1(z
δ+))
∧ Female(2nd(zδ+)) ∧ ¬Loves(2nd(zδ+), f γ2(z
δ+)) ∧ Male(f γ2(z
δ+))
)
where zδ+ has the type of a pair and 1st and 2nd are its projections to the 1st and 2nd compo-
nent, respectively. This requires the variable-condition R to contain {(f γ1, z
δ+), (f γ2, z
δ+)},
which admits the substitution σ′ := {f γ1 7→2nd, f
γ
2 7→1st} to be an R-substitution. Now,
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(B2) together with the (extended) σ′-update of C1 (cf. Definition 5.15) captures the intended
semantics of (B0) correctly.
Finally, note that a choice-condition of
C2(z
δ+) :=
(
Male(1st(zδ
+
)) ∧ Loves(1st(zδ+), f γ1(1st(z
δ+))) ∧ Female(f γ1(1st(z
δ+)))
∧ Female(2nd(zδ+)) ∧ ¬Loves(2nd(zδ+), f γ2(2nd(z
δ+))) ∧ Male(f γ2(2nd(z
δ+)))
)
requires the substitution {f γ1 7→ λu. (2nd(z
δ+)), f γ2 7→ λu. (1st(z
δ+))}, which is still no
R-substitution because of the cycles between zδ+ and f γi . This means that—within cyclic
choices—we should not restrict or project before all ambiguities have been resolved.
6.4.3 Conclusion
We have managed to overcome the two weaknesses of our framework exhibited in §§ 6.4.1
and 6.4.2 by simple deviations. For the Henkin quantifiers we had to increase the order of
variables by raising . For the Bach–Peters sentences we had to replace a cycle of choices with
a single parallel choice. As these problems are somehow unavoidable without paying high
prices, this appears to be acceptable, especially because the partially ordered quantification
required for natural languages in [Hintikka, 1974] is available for free in our framework of
free variables of §§ 4.1 and 5.2.
Indeed, these inelegant aspects of our framework should not lead us to the conclusion
to open Pandora’s box by admitting cyclic choices. This would let most of the famous
antinomies break into our system. If we admitted cyclic choices, we could not even say
anymore whether a choice-condition can be satisfied for a certain free δ+-variable or not.
Example 5.10 in § 5.5 makes the essential problem obvious.
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6.5 More Problems with a Right-Unique ε
In [Geurts, 2000], the use of Hilbert’s ε in form of choice functions for the semantics of
indefinites is attacked in several ways; and it is proposed that there is no way to interpret
indefinites in situ, but that some form of “movement” is necessary, which, roughly speaking,
may be interpreted as changing scopes of quantifiers. Although the examples given in
[Geurts, 2000] are perfectly convincing in the given setting, we would like to point out that
all the presented problems with the ε disappear when one uses a non-right-unique version
such as ours. The following three example sentences and their labels are the ones of [Geurts,
2000].
6.5.1 All bicycles were stolen by a German. (1a)
We model this as
Bicycle(xδ ) ⇒ StolenBy(xδ , yδ+)
with choice-condition
C(yδ
+
) := German(yδ
+
)
If—in a first step—we find a model for this sentence with an empty variable-condition,
then—in a second step—we can check whether it also satisfies a variable-condition that
contains (yδ+, xδ ) in addition. A success of the first step provides us with a model for the
weaker reading; a success of the second step with one for the stronger reading, too; i.e. that
all bicycles were stolen by the same German. And this without “moving” any quantifiers
or the like; which is, however, required when changing from
∀x.
(
Bicycle(x) ⇒ ∃y. (German(y) ∧ StolenBy(x, y))
)
(1a-weak)
to
∃y.
(
German(y) ∧ ∀x. (Bicycle(x) ⇒ StolenBy(x, y))
)
(1a-strong)
For a more interesting problem with right-unique ε, let us consider the following example.
6.5.2 Every girl gave a flower to a boy she fancied. (5)
Ignoring past tense, we model this as
Girl(xδ ) ⇒ Give(xδ , zδ+, yδ+)
with choice-condition
C(yδ
+
) := Girl(xδ ) ⇒ Boy(yδ+) ∧ Loves(xδ , yδ+)
C(zδ
+
) := Flower(zδ
+
)
As a choice function must pick the identical element from an identical extension, in [Geurts,
2000] there is a problem with two girls who love all boys, but give their flowers to two
different ones. This problem does not appear in our modeling because our semantical
relation (cf. Definition 5.5) does not depend on the common extension of their love, but
only has to contain (xδ , yδ+), which is in accordance with our variable-condition, which also
has to contain (xδ , yδ+) due to our above choice-condition for yδ+, cf. Definition 5.9.
The same problem of a common extension but a different choice object—but now in all
possible worlds and intensions—of the following example is again no problem for us.
51
6.5.3 Every odd number is followed by an even number
that is not equal to it. (7)
We model this as
Odd(xδ ) ⇒ xδ +1= yδ+
with choice-condition
C(yδ
+
) := Odd(xδ ) ⇒ Even(yδ+) ∧ yδ+ 6=xδ
All in all, there was no real reason to “move” quantifiers or the like and the arguments of
[Geurts, 2000] are not justified in the absence of a right-unique behavior of the ε. Moreover,
the moving of the quantifiers as from (1a-weak) to (1a-strong) above is more complex and
less intuitive than adding (yδ+, xδ ) to the current variable-condition.
52
6.6 Donkey Sentences and Heusinger’s Indexed ε-Operator
6.6.1 If a man has a donkey, he beats it. (D)
The word “syntax” in the modern sense seems to have its first occurrence in the voluminous
writings of Chrysippus of Soloi (Asia Minor) (3rd centuryb.c.), not the son of Pelops in the
Oedipus mythos, but, of course, after Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes of Assos, the third
leader of the Stoic school. So-called Chrysippus sentences and donkey sentences demon-
strate the difficulties of interaction of indefinite noun phrases in a conditional (“a man”,
“a donkey”) and anaphoric pronouns referring to them in the conclusion (“he”, “it”). Cf. e.g.
[Heusinger, 1997, § 7] for references on donkey and Chrysippus sentences. If semantics is
represented with the help of quantification, donkey sentences reveal difficulties resulting
from quantifiers and their scopes. Let us have a closer look at two examples.
6.6.2 If a man loves a woman, she loves him. (L0)
If we start by modeling this tentatively as
∃y0.
(
Male(y0) ∧ ∃x0.
(
Female(x0) ∧ Loves(y0, x0)
) )
⇒ Female(xγ1) ∧ Loves(x
γ
1, y
γ
1) ∧ Male(y
γ
1)
(L1)
we have no chance to resolve the reference of the pronouns “she” and “him” (xγ1 and y
γ
1)
before we get rid of the quantifiers. If we apply δ−-rules (cf. § 4.2) (besides α- and β-rules)
we end up with the three sequents
¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Female(x
δ
0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ
0 ), Female(x
γ
1)
¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Female(x
δ
0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ
0 ), Loves(x
γ
1, y
γ
1)
¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Female(x
δ
0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ
0 ), Male(y
γ
1)
(L2)
and a variable-condition R including {xγ1, y
γ
1}×{x
δ
0 , y
δ
0 }, which says that the substitution
σ− := {xγ1 7→x
δ
0 , y
γ
1 7→y
δ
0 }
which turns the first and last sequents into tautologies and the middle one (L2) into the
intended reading of (L0), is not anR-substitution and must not be applied, cf. Definition 5.3.
Using δ+-rules instead of the δ−-rules we get
¬Male(yδ+0 ), ¬Female(x
δ+
0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ+
0 , x
δ+
0 ), Female(x
γ
1)
¬Male(yδ
+
0 ), ¬Female(x
δ+
0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ+
0 , x
δ+
0 ), Loves(x
γ
1, y
γ
1)
¬Male(yδ+0 ), ¬Female(x
δ+
0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ+
0 , x
δ+
0 ), Male(y
γ
1)
and a variable-condition R including {(yδ+0 , x
δ+
0 )} instead. After application of the
R-substitution σ+ := {xγ1 7→x
δ+
0 , y
γ
1 7→y
δ+
0 }, the instance of (L1) reduces to
¬Male(yδ+0 ), ¬Female(x
δ+
0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ+
0 , x
δ+
0 ), Loves(x
δ+
0 , y
δ+
0 ) (L3)
which is valid in a utopia where love is symmetric. A closer look reveals that our σ+-updated
variable-condition R now looks like xγ1 x
δ+
0
oo yδ
+
0
//oo yγ1 , while our (σ
+-updated)
R-choice-condition C is
C(yδ
+
0 ) := Male(y
δ+
0 ) ∧ ∃x0.
(
Female(x0) ∧ Loves(y
δ+
0 , x0)
)
C(xδ
+
0 ) := Female(x
δ+
0 ) ∧ Loves(y
δ+
0 , x
δ+
0 )
But even if (L3) may be valid, this is not what we wanted to say in (L0), where “she” and
“he” are obviously meant to be universal (strong, δ−).
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Thus, we had better start without quantifiers from the very beginning , namely directly with
Male(yδ0 ) ∧ Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ
0 ) ∧ Female(x
δ
0 )
⇒ Female(xγ1) ∧ Loves(x
γ
1, y
γ
1) ∧ Male(y
γ
1)
(L4)
and empty variable-condition R′, and then apply the R′-substitution σ− from above to
reduce its instance to
¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ
0 ), ¬Female(x
δ
0 ), Loves(x
δ
0 , y
δ
0 ) (L5)
which captures the universal meaning of (L0) properly.
Instead of a donkey sentence such as (L0) that prefers a genuinely universal reading as
in (L5), the following donkey sentence prefers a partial switch to an existential reading:
6.6.3 If a bachelor loves a woman, he marries her. (M0)
If I love three utopian women, I am loved by all of them, but may marry at most one. Thus
Male(yδ0 ) ∧ Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ
0 ) ∧ Female(x
δ
0 )
⇒ Male(yγ1) ∧ Marries(y
γ
1, x
γ
1) ∧ Female(x
γ
1)
(M1)
should be refined by application of {xγ1 7→ x
δ+
1 , y
γ
1 7→ y
δ
0 } and simplification to
¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ
0 ), ¬Female(x
δ
0 ), Female(x
δ+
1 )
¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ
0 ), ¬Female(x
δ
0 ), Marries(y
δ
0 , x
δ+
1 )
(M2a)
(M2b)
with choice-condition
C(xδ
+
1 ) := Male(y
δ
0 ) ⇒ Loves(y
δ
0 , x
δ+
1 ) ∧ Female(x
δ+
1 ) (C2)
On the one hand, if there is no women loved by the bachelor yδ0 , both (M2a) and (M2b)
are valid. On the other hand, if there is at least one woman he loves, (M2a) is again valid
(due to (C2)) and (M2b) expresses the intended reading of (M0).
Notice that we indeed have the possibility to let “woman” be universal (strong, δ−) and
“her” existential (weak, δ+), picking one of the women loved by the bachelor—if there are
any. Our elegant treatment is more flexible than a similar one of (D) along supposition
theory in [Parsons, 1994]. Moreover, both these treatments are more lucid than the treat-
ment of a sentence in [Heusinger, 1997], which is analogous to (M0): As (12) on p.183 of
[Heusinger, 1997] we find the example
\Wenn ein Mann einen GrosĚen hat, wirft er ihn in die Parkuhr."
“If a man has a dime, he puts it into the meter.” (our translation)
Mutandis mutatis and the readability improved, the modeling of (M0) according to (19a)
on p.185 of [Heusinger, 1997] would be
∃f. ∀i.
(
Loves
(
εiy.Male(y), εf(i)x. Female(x)
)
⇒ Marries
(
εa∗y.Male(y), εa∗x. Female(x)
) ) (19a′)
where the index a∗ of Heusinger’s indexed ε-operator (cf. § 6.3) seems to denote a choice
function that chooses men as i does and women as f(i) does. How a∗ is to be formalized
stays unclear in [Heusinger, 1997]. The real problem, however, is that (19a′) does not
represent the intended meaning of (M0): To wit, take an f such that f(i) always chooses
a woman not loved by the man chosen by i; then (ex falso quodlibet) all our bachelors may
stay unmarried, contradicting (M0). 11
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6.7 Quantifiers for Computing Semantics of Natural Language?
Representation of semantics of sentences and discourses in natural language with the help of
quantifiers is of surprising difficulty. The examples in the previous §§ 6.5 and 6.6 indicate
that quantified logic is problematic as a data structure for computing the semantics of
sentences and discourses in natural language. Moreover, as already shown in § 6.4.1, for
some sentences a precise representation with the quantifiers of first-order logic does not
exist at all. Furthermore, the combinations of different scopes of quantifiers give rise to a
combinatorial explosion of different readings: According to [Koller, 2004, p. 3], the following
sentence, which is easy to understand for human beings, has “64764 different semantic
readings, purely due to scope ambiguity”, “even if one specified syntactic analysis” “is fixed”:
But that would give us all day Tuesday to be there.
I agree with [Hobbs, 1996] in that humans “do not compute the 120 possible readings” of
In most democratic countries most politicians can fool most of the people on
almost every issue most of the time.
Even if we can sometimes restrict the number of possible scopings below n! for n quantifiers,
e.g. by the algorithm of [Hobbs & Schieber, 1987], the number of possible readings is still too
high for computers and human beings. Therefore, the relation of quantifiers to the semantics
of natural language must be questioned. Notice that there are no quantifiers in natural
language, and we can avoid them in the computation of their semantics with the help of
the free-variable semantics introduced in this paper. Besides our most rudimental solution,
we find the three following approaches to overcome quantifiers and scopes in the literature:
1. [Koller, 2004] uses standard quantified logic (plus bound variables outside the lexical
scopes of their quantifiers) as basic language but leaves the formulas syntactically
underspecified. A drawback seems to be that the actual formulas cannot be accessed.
2. [Hobbs, 1996] provides directly accessible formulas, namely some existentially quanti-
fied conjunctions. These formulas, however, are not likely to be close to the semantics
of natural language as they are quite unreadable (to me at least). A modern model-
ing of the “typical elements” of [Hobbs, 1996] should be a new form of free δ-variables
obtained by changing “some π” in Definition 5.17 into “each π” as in [Wirth, 1998,
Definition 5.7 (Definition 4.4 in short version)], cf. our § 5.8. Two different “typi-
cal elements” of the same set (cf. [Hobbs, 1996, p. 6 of WWW version]) can then be
modeled as two variables with the same choice-condition. Moreover, note that our
use of reduction and instantiation in §§ 6.6.2 and 6.6.3 can be easily extended to a
framework of weighted abduction as found in [Hobbs, 2003ff., Chapter 3].
3. Discourse Representation Theory (DRT , cf. e.g. [Kamp & Reyle, 1993], [Kamp &al.,
2005]) shares with [Hobbs, 1996] the preference for existentially quantified conjunc-
tions, but is not restricted to them. Nevertheless, the handling of quantifiers and
scopes (or their substitutes) is quite impractical in DRT—even with the extensions
for generalized quantifiers of [Kamp &al., 2005]. For example, DRT provides only one
kind of free variables and no “typical elements”, and universal quantification comes
only with implications. Therefore, we expect an integration of our explicit character-
ization of free variables and our general way to introduce new tailored kinds of free
variables into DRT to be beneficial. Note that also the accessibility restrictions of
DRT can be captured by our variable-conditions, admitting more flexibility.
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Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) invented first-order logic (including some second-order exten-
sion) in 1878 (so did Charles S. Peirce independently, cf. [Peirce, 1885]) and second-order
logic including λ-abstraction and a ι-operator in 1893, both under the name “BegriĎŊsĚrift”;
cf. [Frege, 1879; 1893/1903] and our Note 2, respectively. Frege designed his BegriĎŊsĚrift not
for the task of computing the semantics of sentences in natural language, but actually—just
as Guiseppe Peano (1858–1932) his ideography, cf. [Peano, 1896f.]—to overcome the impre-
cision and ambiguity of natural language. He cannot be blamed for the trouble quantifiers
raise in representation and computation of the semantics of natural language. In [Frege,
1879], he is well aware of the difference of the semantics of natural language and his BegriĎŊ-
sĚrift and compares it to that of the naked eye and the microscope. Indeed, Frege saw the
BegriĎŊsĚrift as fundamentally different from natural language and as a substitute for it:
\Wenn eŊ eine Aufgabe der Philosophie iĆ, die HerrsĚaft deŊ WorteŊ đber den mensĚliĚen GeiĆ zu breĚen, indem sie die
TĽusĚungen aufdeĘt, die durĚ den SpraĚgebrauĚ đber die Beziehungen der BegriĎe oft faĆ unvermeidliĚ entĆehen,
indem sie den Gedanken von demjenigen befreit, womit ihn allein die BesĚaĎenheit deŊ spraĚliĚen AuŊdruĘŊmittelŊ
behaftet, so wird meine BegriĎŊsĚrift, fđr diese ZweĘe weiter auŊgebildet, den Philosophen ein brauĚbareŊ Werkzeug
werden kŹnnen. FreiliĚ gibt auĚ sie, wie eŊ bei einem Ľuern DarĆellungŊmittel wohl niĚt anderŊ mŹgliĚ iĆ, den
Gedanken niĚt rein wieder; aber einerseitŊ kann man diese AbweiĚungen auf daŊ UnvermeidliĚe und UnsĚĽdliĚe be-
sĚrĽnken, andererseitŊ iĆ sĚon dadurĚ, dasŊ sie ganz anderer Art sind alŊ die der SpraĚe eigentđmliĚen, ein SĚuŃ
gegen eine einseitige BeeinfluĄung durĚ eineŊ dieser AuŊdruĘŊmittel gegeben."
[Frege, 1879, p.VIf., modernized orthography]
“If it is a task of philosophy to break the dominance of natural language over the human
mind
• by discovering the deceptions on the relations of notions resulting from the use of
language often almost inevitably,
• by liberating the idea of what spoils it just by the linguistic means of expression,
then my BegriĎŊsĚrift—once further improved for these aims—will become a useful tool for
the philosophers. Of course—as it seems to be unavoidable for any external means of
representation—also the BegriĎŊsĚrift is not able to represent the idea undistortedly; but, on
the one hand,
• it is possible to limit these distortions to the unavoidable and harmless, and, on the
other hand
• a protection against a one-sided influence of one of these means of expression is
given already because those of the BegriĎŊsĚrift are completely different from those
characteristic of language.” (our translation)
6.8 Conclusion
In this § 6, we have demonstrated our new indefinite semantics for Hilbert’s ε and our free-
variable framework in a series of interesting applications provided by standard examples
from linguistics. Can this serve as a paradigm useful in the specification and computation
of semantics of discourses in natural language? An investigation of this question requires
a close collaboration of experts from both linguistics and logics. Be the answer to this
question as it may, the field has provided us with an excellent test bed for descriptive terms
and their logical frameworks.
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7 Conclusion
Our novel indefinite semantics for Hilbert’s ε presented in this paper was developed to solve
the difficult soundness problems arising during the combination of mathematical induction
in the liberal style of Fermat’s descente infinie with state-of-the-art deduction.12 Thereby,
it had passed an evaluation of its usefulness even before it was recognized as a candidate
for the semantics that David Hilbert probably had in mind for his ε. While the speculation
on this question will go on, the semantical framework for Hilbert’s ε proposed in this paper
definitely has the following advantages:
Syntax: The requirement of a commitment to a choice is expressed syntactically and
most clearly by the sharing of a free δ+-variable, cf. § 4.5.
Semantics: The semantics of the ε is simple and straightforward in the sense that the
ε-operator becomes similar to the referential use of the indefinite article in some
natural languages. As we have seen in § 6, it is indeed so natural that it provides some
help in understanding ideas on philosophy of language which were not easily accessible
before. Our semantics for the ε is based on an abstract formal approach that extends
a semantics for closed formulas (satisfying only very weak requirements, cf. § 5.3) to
a semantics with several kinds of free variables: existential (γ), universal (δ−), and
ε-constrained (δ+).
Reasoning: In a reductive proof step, our representation of an ε-term εx. A can be
replaced with any term t that satisfies the formula ∃x.A ⇒ A{x7→t}, cf. § 4.6.
Thus, the soundness of such a replacement is likely to be expressible and verifiable in
the original calculus. Our free-variable framework for the ε is especially convenient
for developing proofs in the style of a working mathematician, cf. [Wirth, 2004; 2006].
Indeed, our approach makes proof work most simple because we do not have to
consider all proper choices t for x (as in all other semantical approaches) but only
a single arbitrary one, which is fixed in a proof step, just as choices are settled in
program steps, cf. § 4.4.
Finally, we hope that new semantical framework will help to solve further practical and
theoretical problems with the ε and improve the applicability of the ε as a logical tool for
description and reasoning. Although we have only touched the surface of the subject in § 5.8,
a tailoring of operators similar to our ε to meet the special demands of specification and
computation in various areas (such as semantics of discourses in natural language) seems
to be especially promising.
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Notes
Note 1 (History of the Symbols used to denote the ι-Binder)
It may be necessary to say something on the symbols used for the ι in the 19th and 20th
century. In [Peano, 1896f.], Guiseppe Peano (1858–1932) wrote ι¯ instead of the ι of Exam-
ple 2.1, and ι¯{ x | A } instead of ιx. A. (Note that we have changed the class notation
to modern standard here. We will do so in the following without mentioning it. Peano
actually wrote x∈A instead of { x | A } in [Peano, 1896f.].)
More than in Frege’s logic calculus, Peano was interested in logic as a written language
(ideography) with a clear description of its semantics in natural language. He also created
an artificial substitute for natural language (Latino sine flexione, cf. e.g. [Kennedy, 2002]).
Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that it was Peano who invented the ι-binder. Cf.,
however, Note 2 on Frege’s ι-operator of 1893. In [Peano, 1899b], we find an alternative
notation besides ι¯, namely a ι-symbol upside-down, i.e. inverted, i.e. rotated by π around its
center. I do not know whether this is the first occurrence of the inverted ι-symbol. It was
later used also in [Whitehead & Russell, 1910–1913], the infamous Principia Mathematica
first published in 1910ff.. Thus, we should speak of Peano’s ι-symbol and not of Russell’s
ι-symbol .
We call the famous Principia Mathematica infamous, because it is still rare and unafford-
able, and—as standard notions and notation have changed quite a bit in the meanwhile—has
become also quite incomprehensible for the occasional reader. It is a shame that there is no
public interactive WWW version of the Principia, which facilitates look-up by translation
into modern notation and online help with obsolete names.
Let us come back to Peano’s ι. The bar above as well as the inversion of the ι were to
indicated that ι¯ was implicitly defined as the inverse operator of the operator ι defined by
ιy := {y}, which occurred already in [Peano, 1890] and still in [Quine, 1981].
The definition of ι¯ reads literally [Peano, 1896f., Definition 22]:
a∈K . ∃a : x, y ∈ a . ⊃x,y . x= y : ⊃ : x = ι¯a . = . a= ιx
This straightforwardly translates into more modern notation as follows:
For any class a: a 6= ∅ ∧ ∀x, y. (x, y ∈ a ⇒ x= y) ⇒ ∀x. (x = ι¯a ⇔ a= ιx)
Giving up the flavor of an explicit definition of “ x = ι¯a ”, this can be simplified to the
following logically equivalent form:
For any class a: ∃!x. x∈ a ⇒ ι¯a∈ a (ι¯0)
Besides notational difference, this is (ι0) of our § 2.1.2.
It has become standard to write a simple non-inverted ι for the upside-down ι be-
cause Peano’s original notation “ ιy ” has long ago been replaced with “ {y} ” and be-
cause the upside-down ι is not easily available in today’s typesetting. For instance, there
does not seem to exist a TEX macro for it and—to enable font-independent archiving and
republishing—some publishers do not permit the usage of nonstandard symbols.
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Note 2 (Other ι-Operators Besides those of Russell, Hilbert, and Peano)
In [Frege, 1893/1903, Vol. I, § 11], we find another ι-operator. As this Vol. I was published
by Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) in 1893, this seems to be the first occurrence of a ι-operator in
the literature. The symbol he uses for the ι is a boldface backslash. As a boldface version of
the backslash does not seem to be available in standard TEX, we use a simple backslash (\)
here. Frege defines \ξ := x if there is some x such that ∀y. (ξ(y) = (x= y)). Writing the
binder as a modern λ instead of Frege’s spiritus lenis, Frege actually requires extensional
equality of ξ and λy. (x= y). Now this would be basically Peano’s ι-operator (cf. our
§ 2.1.2 and Note 1) unless Frege overspecified it by defining \ξ := ξ for all other cases.
Similarly, in set theories without urelements, the ι-operator is often defined by something
like ιy. A := { z | ∃x. (z ∈ x ∧ ∀y. (A ⇔ (x = y))) } for new x and z, cf. e.g. [Quine, 1981].
This is again an overspecification resulting in ιy. A = ∅ in case of ¬∃!y. A.
Note 3 To be precise, in the standard predicate calculus of [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70]
there are no axiom schemes but only axioms with predicate variables. The axiom schemes
we use here simplify the presentation and refer to the modified form of the predicate calculus
of [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70, Vol. II, p. 403], which is closer to today’s standard syntax
of first-order logic.
Note 4 (Consequences of the ε-Formula in Intuitionistic Logic)
Adding the ε either with (ε0), with (ε1), or with the ε-formula (cf. §§ 2.1.3 and 2.3) to
intuitionistic first-order logic is equivalent on the ε-free theory to adding Plato’s Principle,
i.e. ∃x. (∃y. A ⇒ A{y 7→x}) with x not occurring in A, cf. [Meyer-Viol, 1995, § 3.3].
Moreover, the non-trivial direction of (ε2) is ∀x.A ⇐ A{x 7→ εx.¬A}.
Even intuitionistically, this entails its contrapositive ¬∀x.A ⇒ ¬A{x 7→ εx.¬A}
and then, e.g. by the trivial direction of (ε1) (when A is replaced with ¬A)
¬∀x.A ⇒ ∃x.¬A (Q2)
which is not valid in intuitionistic logic in general. Thus, the universal quantifier in Hilbert’s
intended object logic—if it includes (ε2) or anything similar for the universal quantifier (such
as Hilbert’s τ -operator, cf. [Hilbert, 1923a])—is strictly weaker than in intuitionistic logic.
More precisely, adding
∀x.A ⇐ A{x 7→ τx. A} (τ0)
is equivalent on the τ -free theory to adding ∃x. (∀y. A ⇐ A{y 7→x}) with x not occurring
in A, which again implies (Q2), cf. [Meyer-Viol, 1995, § 3.4.2].
From a semantical view, cf. [Gabbay, 1981], the intuitionistic ∀ may be eliminated, how-
ever, by first applying the Gödel translation into the modal logic S4 with classical ∀ and ¬,
cf. e.g. [Fitting, 1999], and then adding the ε conservatively, e.g. by avoiding substitutions
via λ-abstraction as in [Fitting, 1975].
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Note 5 Besides the already mentioned extensional treatment of ε, in [Giese & Ahrendt,
1999] we also find an intentional treatment (which, roughly speaking, results from requiring
the axiom (ε0)) and a substitutive treatment where also the validity of the Substitution
[Value] Lemma for ε-terms is required:
eval
(
S
)(
(εx. A){yfree 7→t}
)
= eval
(
S ⊎ {yfree 7→ eval(S)(t)}
)(
εx. A
)
Here x is a bound and yfree is a free variable. Since logics where the Substitution Lemma
for ε-free formulas does not hold are not considered (such as the first-order modal logic
of [Fitting, 1999]), in [Giese & Ahrendt, 1999] we find a theorem basically saying that every
extensional structure is substitutive.
Note 6
( 0 6=1, εx. A0 6= εx. A1 ⇒ ¬(∀x.A0 ∧ ∀x.A1) ⊢ B ∨ ¬B in intuitionistic logic)
For the proof of the weaker 0 6=1, (E2) ⊢ B ∨ ¬B for any formula B, cf. already [Bell
&al., 2001, Proof of Theorem6.4], which already occurs in more detail in [Bell, 1993a, § 3],
and is sketched in [Bell, 1993b, § 7].
Let B be an arbitrary formula. We are going to show that ⊢ B ∨ ¬B holds in intu-
itionistic logic under the assumptions of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity of “=”, the
ε-formula (or (ε0)), and of the formulas 0 6=1 and εx. A0 6= εx. A1 ⇒ ¬(∀x.A0 ∧ ∀x.A1).
Let x be a variable not occurring in B. Set Ai := (B ∨ x= i).
Now what we have to show is a trivial consequence of the following Claims 1 and 2,
⊢ εx. A0 6= εx. A1 ⇒ ¬(∀x.A0 ∧ ∀x.A1), and Claim3.
Claim1: 0=0, 1=1, (ε-formula){A7→A0, t7→0}, (ε-formula){A7→A1, t7→1}
⊢ B ∨ (εx. A0 =0 ∧ εx. A1 =1).
Claim2: εx. A0 =0 ∧ εx. A1 =1, 0 6=1, ∀x, y, z. (y=x ∧ y= z ⇒ x= z)
⊢ εx. A0 6= εx. A1.
Claim3: ¬(∀x.A0 ∧ ∀x.A1) ⊢ ¬B.
Proof of Claim1: From the ε-formula and reflexivity of “=”, we get ⊢ Ai{x7→εx. Ai}.
Thus, ⊢ A0{x7→εx. A0} ∧ A1{x7→εx. A1}. From this, Claim1 follows by distributivity.
Q.e.d. (Claim1)
Proof of Claim2: Trivial. Q.e.d. (Claim2)
Proof of Claim3: As x does not occur in B, we get B ⊢ ∀x.Ai. The rest is trivial.
Q.e.d. (Claim3)
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Note 7 Regarding the classification of one of the δ-rules as “liberalized”, we could try to
object that Vfree(A) is not necessarily a subset of Vγδ+(Γ ∀x.A Π), because it may include
some additional free δ−-variables.
But the additional free δ−-variables blocked by the δ+-rules (as compared to the
δ−-rules) do not block proofs in practice. This has following reason: With a reason-
ably minimal variable-condition R, the only additional cycles that could occur are of the
form yγδ+ R zδ R xδ+ R+ yγδ+ with yγδ+, zδ ∈ V(Γ ∀x.A Π); unless we substitute
something for xδ+. And in this case the corresponding δ−-rule would result in the cycle
yγδ
+
R xδ R+ yγδ
+ anyway.
Moreover, δ−-rules and free δ−-variables do not occur in inference systems with δ+-
rules before [Wirth, 2004], so that in the earlier systems Vfree(A) is indeed a subset of
Vγδ+(Γ ∀x.A Π).
Note 8 If the occurrences of yδ+ in C(yδ+) could differ in their arguments, there could
be irresolvable conflicts on special arguments. And, in these conflicts, the choice of a
function as a whole would essentially violate Hilbert’s axiomatizations: As only terms and
no functions are considered in [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968/70], the axiom schemes (ε0) and
(ε-formula) (cf. §§ 2.1.3 and 2.3) seem to require us to choose the values of this function
individually. For example, in case of
C(yδ
+
) = λb.
(
yδ
+
(b) ∧ ¬(yδ+(true) ∧ yδ+(false))
)
,
for choosing yδ+, we are in conflict between λb′. (b′= false) (i.e. λb′.¬b′, for C(yδ+)(false) to
be true) and λb′. (b′= true) (i.e. λb′. b′, for C(yδ+)(true) to be true).
63
Note 9 (Do Salience, Specifity, and Uniqueness Determine Definiteness?)
Salience is the property of being known and prominent in discourse. Specifity is a property
concerning the referential status for a speaker, expressing that he has a specific object in
mind. Salience, specifity, and uniqueness are important aspects immanent in the distinction
of definite and indefinite forms. In [Heusinger, 1997, p.1], we find the thesis that definiteness
of articles expresses salience. This thesis is opposed to others emphasizing the aspects of
uniqueness (as in the tradition of [Russell, 1905a]) or specifity instead of salience. The
thesis is supported by the following two examples:
(definite, salient, specific, but not unique)
“The dog got in a fight with another dog.”
[Heusinger, 1997, p. 20; our underlining]
(indefinite, not salient, but specific)
\IĚ suĚe ei n B u Ě, d a Ŋ i Ě g e s t e r n b e k o m m e n h a b e; eŊ iĆ
ein sĚŹneŊ." [Heusinger, 1997, p.16]
“I am looking for a book which I got yesterday; it is a beautiful one.”
(our translation, our underlining)
Nevertheless, indefiniteness is typically unspecific:
(indefinite, not salient, unspecific)
\IĚ suĚe (irgend) ei n B u Ě; eŊ soll ein sĚŹneŊ sein." [Heusinger, 1997, p.16]
“I am looking for a(n arbitrary) book; it is to be a beautiful one.”
(our translation, our underlining)
Heusinger’s thesis is not consistent, however, with the following example: Thomas Mann
(1875–1955) starts his narration “Der kleine Herr Friedemann” as follows:
(definite, specific, but not salient)
\Die Amme hatte die SĚuld. { " [Mann, 1898]
“The nurse bore the blame. — ” (our translation, our underlining)
Obviously, none of uniqueness, salience, or specifity alone determines definiteness of articles:
For uniqueness this becomes obvious from the first example already. For salience and
specifity the following table may be helpful:
Salient Not Salient
Specific {The dog, . . . } {a book, . . . } ⊎ {The nurse, . . . }
Unspecific ∅ {a(n arbitrary) book , . . . }
If—as I conjecture—examples for “indefinite, but salient” do not exist, salience indeed
requires definite forms; but not vice versa. In the technical treatment of salience with
Heusinger’s indexed ε-operator in [Heusinger, 1997], however, salience and definite forms
indeed require each other.
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Note 10 Note that our modeling of (H1) as (H3) of § 6.4.1 is correct, whereas the modeling
of (H0) as (25c) of [Heusinger, 1996] is flawed: Mutatis mutandis, both “hating” and “being
a relative” replaced with “loving”, already the less complex (25b) of [Heusinger, 1996] has
this flaw and reads:
∃x1, y1. ∀x0, y0.




Female(x0)
∧ Male(y0)
∧ Loves(x0, y1(x0))
∧ Loves(y0, x1(y0))

 ⇒
(
Loves(y1(x0), x1(y0))
∧ Loves(x1(y0), y1(x0))
) (25b′)
Indeed, it is easy to see from (H2) that the polarity of the first two (negative) occurrences
of the Loves-predicate in (25b′) must actually be positive.
Note 11 (Technical Disadvantages of Heusinger’s Indexed ε-operator)
When trying to understand the semantics of sentences in natural language, it might be the
case that a representation of the indefinite article with (a variant of) our new indefinite
semantics for the ε offers the following advantages compared to [Heusinger, 1997]:
1. We do not have to disambiguate a specific from a non-specific usage in advance,
contrary to [Heusinger, 1997] where we have to choose between G(εlx. F (x)) and
∃i.G( εix. F (x)) eagerly. Besides this, the design decision to pack the information
on specificity into the ε-term may be questioned.
2. For a computer implementation, the l and i in these formulas have to be implemented
as something isomorphic to free δ+-variables (or free γ-variables) anyway, so that our
representation (i.e. G(xδ+) with choice-condition C(xδ+) := F (xδ+)) saves one level
of indirection.
3. Our possibility of a formally verified instantiation of free δ+-variables (cf. § 4.6 and
Theorem5.21(6)) could provide a formal means in the stepwise process of approaching
the intended semantics of sentences in natural language.
Note 12 The well-foundedness required for the soundness of descente infinie gave rise
to a notion of reduction which preserves solutions, cf. Definition 5.20. The liberalized
δ-rules as found in [Fitting, 1996] do not satisfy this notion. The addition of our choice-
conditions finally turned out to be the only way to repair this defect of the liberalized
δ-rules. Cf. [Wirth, 2004] for more details.
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